On September 9, 2026, the Beijing "15th Five-Year" High-Tech Industry Development Plan (Jing Zheng Fa [2026] No. 16) was released. Nowhere in the document can an independent chapter on the "low-altitude economy" be found. Instead, related content is divided into two "energy-level leap industries": under "Aerospace Technology", it focuses on "developing new energy aircraft, promoting innovative breakthroughs in airspace equipment and aerospace vehicles, and strengthening the manufacturing of key aviation components, aviation material support, and aviation maintenance"; under "New Security and Emergency Response", it emphasizes "advancing the R&D of airspace detection, identification, and security countermeasure technologies, forming a product portfolio and industrialization capability for security and emergency response".
What truly warrants scrutiny is the terminology used: "airspace", not "low-altitude". Beijing does not intend to operate a single low-altitude track; rather, it integrates low-altitude operations into a unified "low-altitude—high-altitude—space" macro-aerospace system, sharing a common technological foundation with satellite constellations and space situational awareness.
This is further illustrated by the regulations implemented four months prior. On May 1, 2026, the Beijing Municipal Regulations on the Management of Unmanned Aircraft came into effect: the entire administrative area of Beijing is designated as controlled airspace for unmanned aircraft, requiring applications for all outdoor flight activities; transporting or carrying unmanned aircraft and their core components into Beijing is prohibited; and the sale or lease of unmanned aircraft and core components to units and individuals in Beijing is banned both online and offline. How detailed are the three normative documents issued by the Municipal Public Security Bureau? The Catalog of Core Components for Unmanned Aircraft (Trial) includes 17 components across four major systems: airframe structure, flight control, communication, and power. Storing more than three complete aircraft or more than ten core components at the same address classifies the location as a storage facility.
During the same timeframe, Shanghai took the opposite approach. In January 2026, Shanghai announced the designated flight airspace for micro, light, and small unmanned aircraft, with the flight-enabled airspace accounting for 46% of the city's total administrative area. Flights below an absolute altitude of 120 meters require no prior declaration once registered. On February 1, the Interim Measures of Shanghai Municipality for the Flight Safety Management of Civil Unmanned Aircraft came into effect, alongside the launch of a comprehensive low-altitude flight supervision and service platform. The platform emphasizes "rapid declaration and one-click takeoff", and designates the Expo Culture Park, Century Park, and Shanghai Botanical Garden as consumer-grade drone flight experience zones.
Under the same national airspace, these two megacities have provided nearly opposite answers. This is not merely a difference in style, but the starting point of the policy divergence among the five cities.
Airspace Regulations: The Sharpest Watershed
All designs for the low-altitude economy ultimately hit the same wall: airspace cannot be approved by local authorities. Therefore, the differences among the five cities do not lie in "who has more airspace", but in the institutional frameworks each uses to interface with this national prerogative.
Beijing has solidified strict management into law. With city-wide control, four-stage management (production, sales, transportation, storage), and a catalog of 17 core components, the logic is entirely subordinate to capital security and the guarantee of major events. It does, however, leave some openings: counter-terrorism and stability maintenance, disaster rescue, major events, as well as teaching, scientific research, production, agriculture and forestry production, and sports training and competitions can utilize special guarantee channels following safety assessments.
Shanghai and Guangzhou have opted for categorized release. Shanghai has designated 46% of its airspace as declaration-free, underpinned by a "Five Ones" system of military-civilian coordination, adhering to the principle of "no low-altitude without safety, and only what can be managed can be released". In a breakthrough move, the Guangzhou Low-Altitude Economy Development Regulation proposes "categorizing and designating flight-enabled and controlled airspace for unmanned aircraft", with the scope dynamically published by a municipal platform. Major issues are resolved through a tripartite coordination mechanism involving the provincial government, air traffic management agencies, and civil aviation authorities.
Hefei and Chengdu are taking a third path—trading mechanisms and pilot programs for airspace. Hefei has established the country's first city-level joint low-altitude flight service center, providing "one-stop service" for airspace applications, routes, and flight plans. Its confidence stems from Anhui being the third province nationwide to pilot the reform of city-wide low-altitude airspace management. In November 2024, Chengdu was selected by the Central Air Traffic Control Committee as one of the six pilot cities for eVTOL. It leverages normalized military-civilian coordination to strive for the optimization of flight-enabled airspace and the designation of public air routes, while the government side promotes "scan-to-fly".
Three governance philosophies: Beijing solidifies control through legislation, Shanghai and Guangzhou solidify release through legislation, and Hefei and Chengdu trade for airspace by striving for pilot programs.
The legislative forms are also entirely different. Guangzhou's Low-Altitude Economy Development Regulation (implemented on February 28, 2025, comprising eight chapters and 41 articles) is a typical promotional regulation, encouraging the participation of social capital in construction and operation. Beijing's Regulations on the Management of Unmanned Aircraft, also a local regulation passed by the Municipal People's Congress Standing Committee, is regulatory in nature—the legislative explanation explicitly states, "As the capital, Beijing's low-altitude security faces more challenges." Shanghai currently only has interim measures at the municipal government regulation level, but the Implementation Plan for Building Shanghai's Low-Altitude Flight Service and Management Capability has clearly stipulated promoting legislation by the end of 2027. Hefei uses the Standing Committee of the People's Congress's Decision on Promoting the Development of the Low-Altitude Economy (passed on October 25, 2024) for low-cost supplementation. Chengdu still lacks dedicated local low-altitude regulations, relying mainly on annual industry chain work priorities and scenario plans for advancement—this is its most obvious shortcoming.
Industrial Entry Points of the Five Cities
Scale targets are often used for ranking, but the statistical calibers of the five cities are fundamentally incomparable. Guangzhou's target of CNY 150 billion (by 2027) includes over CNY 110 billion in manufacturing output, CNY 30 billion in operational services, and over CNY 10 billion in infrastructure investment; Shanghai's targets of CNY 50 billion (2027) and CNY 80 billion (2028) refer to core industry scale; Beijing's target is at the CNY 100 billion level in its 2024 action plan; and Chengdu's CNY 45 billion is the target for 2026. Ranking these figures is meaningless.
What is truly worth examining is which segment of the industrial chain each city has targeted.
Beijing does not seek full-category agglomeration. It does not mention scale for complete aircraft; the focus is on the R&D of new energy aircraft, airspace equipment, and aerospace vehicles, coupled with existing strengths in high value-added, low land-use areas such as key aviation components, aviation material support, and aviation maintenance. The other pillar is detection and identification, security countermeasures, next-generation emergency communications (private network communication terminals, core chips, networking equipment), and early warning perception and high-end monitoring equipment. The 2024 action plan aims to "establish security and countermeasure capabilities covering various types of drones and 'low, slow, and small' aircraft with efficient coordination across high, medium, and low altitudes by 2027, creating a national benchmark", and to build a low-altitude security industrial park. The primary buyers are public security, counter-terrorism SWAT teams, major event security, and key government units—a typical G-end (government-end) market.
Shanghai pursues a three-pronged complete aircraft route: simultaneously advancing 4-6 passenger manned eVTOLs, medium-to-long-range heavy-payload industrial drones, and new energy general aviation aircraft with 19 seats or fewer. Supporting efforts target high energy-density aviation power batteries, high power-to-weight ratio electric drives, networked communication, navigation, and flight control avionics. The Several Measures of Shanghai Municipality on Linking the Yangtze River Delta to Accelerate the Construction of an Advanced Manufacturing Cluster for the Low-Altitude Economy (jointly issued by the Municipal Commission of Economy and Informatization and five other units on December 26, 2025) sets targets for 2028: a scale of around CNY 80 billion, 10 leading complete aircraft enterprises, batch manufacturing capacity of over 500 units, and driving over CNY 20 billion in new investments. The research list explicitly includes "detection and countermeasures, display control and air traffic management". The foundation is indeed solid: as of 2025, there are nearly 800 registered drone operating enterprises, about 220,000 drones registered under real names, and over 3.2 million flight sorties throughout the year. Over 50% of the country's leading eVTOL enterprises are in Shanghai, and 4 of the 5 companies in China that have achieved the first eVTOL flight were born here.
Guangzhou plays the "complete aircraft + producer services + going global" card. Its advantageous tracks are eVTOL, flying cars, and drones, but the differentiation lies in R&D and design, testing and certification, test flights, and airworthiness certification. Relying on the Guangdong Institute of Aerospace Science and Technology, GRG Metrology & Test, and the Fifth Electronics Research Institute of the MIIT, it supports the capacity enhancement of the Guangzhou Airworthiness Certification Sub-center. On the technology side, it builds a "six-in-one" low-altitude intelligent network integrating "communication, navigation, surveillance, meteorology, computing power, and countermeasures". Strategically, it promotes "Made in Guangzhou, via Hong Kong and Macao, sold globally", partnering with Hong Kong to expand into the Middle East and Southeast Asia.
Chengdu is rooted in industrial drones. The product lines of AVIC UAV, JOUAV, and Tengdun cover reconnaissance, surveying and mapping, patrol, logistics, and large-scale freight. They are naturally suited for the western mountains, plateaus, long distances, heavy payloads, and complex weather, proactively avoiding direct competition with Shanghai and Guangzhou in eVTOLs and consumer drones. The Twin-tailed Scorpion D route between Chengdu and Dazhou completes the two-way transportation of fresh produce and electronic products in about two hours, verifying the intercity freight and night flight capabilities of ton-class drones.
Hefei is betting on manned eVTOL validation. Luogang Park serves as a city-level model. The country's first urban air mobility hub can simultaneously store 10 aircraft and integrate ticketing, security checks, waiting, command and dispatch, charging, and maintenance. Locally, aviation-grade solid-state batteries with the world's highest energy density and centimeter-level positioning systems have been deployed. As of August 2026, the EH216-S has completed over 5,000 test flight sorties in Luogang—for manned airworthiness and commercial insurance, the number of test flight sorties is more valuable than route subsidies.
Funding and Strategic Depth
Guangzhou has the most aggressive intensity: the aerospace industry investment fund officially announced in May 2026 targets a total scale of CNY 20 billion, covering the entire chain of low-altitude and aerospace. Shanghai's incentives are the most precise: up to CNY 100 million for complete aircraft projects, up to CNY 50 million for key core technology research, up to CNY 20 million for testing, test flight, and inspection platforms, and one-time rewards for complete aircraft and key components like engines and propellers that obtain TC/PC certification. Hefei focuses on cultivating capabilities rather than subsidizing routes: up to CNY 15 million for manned eVTOL certification, and up to CNY 20 million annually (cumulatively not exceeding CNY 100 million) for newly introduced new-type R&D institutions. Beijing does not rely on single-item subsidies, but on scenario opening, central-local cooperation, and government procurement—the Beijing Work Plan for Accelerating the Cultivation and Opening Application of Scenarios in May 2026 lists "low-altitude security" as a standalone capital security scenario, targeting over 15 national-level landmark scenarios, over 100 municipal-level demonstration scenarios, and the landing of over 200 new technologies and products by 2028.
Shanghai, in coordination with the Yangtze River Delta, aims to build the first batch of low-altitude inter-provincial navigation cities in the country. Jinshan has been approved for 1,370 square kilometers of cross-provincial low-altitude airspace, cumulatively supporting about 270,000 flight sorties, and has released the Hangzhou Bay Low-Altitude Coordination Demonstration Zone. Guangzhou relies on the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area to explore cross-border routes. Beijing promotes the coordinated low-altitude three-dimensional defense and disposal scenarios for the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, with R&D output within Beijing, and manufacturing support and scenario validation undertaken by Tianjin and Hebei. Chengdu has opened the first low-altitude branch logistics route between the Chengdu-Chongqing twin cities. Hefei simultaneously capitalizes on Anhui's province-wide reform pilot and the sci-tech innovation resources of the Yangtze River Delta.
Where the Real Problems Lie
The completeness of policy texts is one thing; industrial output is another.
Shanghai needs to prove that its 46% flight-enabled airspace can translate into sustainable commercial returns—airworthiness certification is merely the threshold; what follows are operational certificates, operational efficiency, and public acceptance. Manufacturing accounts for the lion's share of Guangzhou's CNY 150 billion target, and both goals of the "first flying car" and the "first domestic city for commercial operation of manned flights" are tied to the pace of certification. While supply chain localization is loudly proclaimed, the shortcomings remain. Beijing's risk lies in the excessively high proportion of security investment, which may squeeze out consumer and manned scenarios. Whether it can transform its security capabilities into industrial revenue exportable to the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region and even the whole country is the key to its success or failure. Chengdu faces insufficient legislation and airworthiness service supply, and with the "15th Five-Year" targets of 275 take-off and landing facilities, 300 routes, and 6 million flight sorties, the complexity of operational organization will sharply increase. Hefei's hidden danger is "emphasizing demonstration over scale". Whether the Luogang model can be replicated from a single park to the entire city depends on cracking the hard nuts of multi-operator sharing, dynamic airspace release, and cost allocation.
Ultimately, the five cities have never been competing for the same title of "No. 1 Low-Altitude City". Beijing seeks the commanding heights and standard output; Shanghai aims for complete aircraft and airworthiness scale; Guangzhou wants a complete closed loop of manufacturing plus going global; Chengdu targets a western freight network; and Hefei seeks manned validation experience and urban air mobility rules. The sky is vast, and what each city can truly occupy is only the segment it has chosen.