Author | Su Peng In the summer of 2022, a 50-page PPT was delivered to the headquarters of CATL (Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited). The PPT was prepared by the Zeekr team. What they wanted to secure was the first-launch right of the Qilin battery. At that time, it was still half a year away from mass production, but Li Auto, Avatr, AITO, and Neta had already swarmed in. Whoever secured the first launch would gain an extra trump card in the high-end pure electric vehicle (EV) market. Zeekr's PPT included more than just their willingness to cooperate. They committed to a large advance payment in advance, directly locking in the first batch of mass production capacity for the first quarter of 2023; they were also willing to cooperate with CATL to adjust the chassis and thermal management of the SEA (Sustainable Experience Architecture) platform for joint calibration... On the other hand, the conditions offered by Li Auto were: CATL's share during the lifecycle of the MEGA will be no less than 70%, with a guaranteed minimum purchase volume and a partial advance payment. Ultimately, Zeekr secured the first launch. This battle revealed an unwritten rule in the power battery industry: for the first-launch right of top-tier battery technology, money is not the only bargaining chip, nor even the most important one. A closer cooperative relationship, deeper joint R&D, and better-matched vehicle launch schedules—these are more convincing than simply offering a higher price. Meanwhile, another hidden thread was also growing. While Tier-2 suppliers were grabbing orders in the low-end market, they were always ready to "fill the gaps" for CATL. The OEMs' A/B supplier strategy has become standard in the industry: among the top 20 best-selling models by sales volume, over 80% adopt a dual- or triple-supplier strategy. A single vehicle of the same configuration may ship with CATL batteries in one batch and Sunwoda batteries in the next, provided the variant has been filed with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). An even more covert operation is "shadow nomination": OEMs require Tier-2 suppliers to complete compatibility audits, PPAP (Production Part Approval Process) documents, and small-batch trial production in advance, but only list CATL in the press releases. Once CATL's capacity allocation falls short in a certain quarter, the Tier-2 factories immediately activate to fill the gap.
What the outside world sees as a "sudden battery change" is actually the result of 3 to 6 months of covert cooperation. A shadow war revolving around scarce resources has never ceased. CATL's defense in the high-end market, the Tier-2 suppliers' offense in the crevices, and the OEMs' game of maintaining balance among giants together constitute the most realistic picture of China's current power battery industry. The core contradiction of this "shadow war" lies in the fact that the supply relationship has never been truly equal. Scarcity depends on price, while oversupply depends on binding—when capacity is loose, the depth of cooperation is the hard currency. Even CATL, facing Mercedes-Benz's independent sampling and re-testing in its laboratories, must accept the "buyer's re-inspection right," whereas domestic OEMs usually only recognize the factory inspection certificate. From the 700-page German specification document between CATL and BMW, to Sunwoda's 48-hour modification plan at Li Auto's Changzhou factory, to Gotion High-Tech exporting German reports at 2 a.m. for Volkswagen auditors. In just over a decade, China's power battery industry has completed the system built by German automakers over half a century.
But the true competitiveness of the industry lies not in the parameter sheets, but in the unseen repetitions, trial and error, and standards scolded out by customers. First be an apprentice, then a partner; only after a long cycle can one dare to talk about the right to speak. This is perhaps the most underlying logic of the entire shadow war.
CATL: Scarcity Commands a Premium The depth of cooperation and the pattern of discourse power in the upstream and downstream of the industry chain are essentially dominated by the supply and demand relationship. Even a giant like CATL, the global battery giant with technological leadership, the number one market share, and deep binding with mainstream OEMs, has its discourse power built on the supply and demand relationship. We might glimpse CATL's dominance from a joke by Neil Shen to Robin Zeng: "If NIO, Li Auto, and XPeng want to get battery capacity, do they need to drink a few more glasses of wine, or make a few more trips to CATL's headquarters?" Zeng Yuqun's response was straightforward: "(OEMs) pay to book the entire production line, and I will produce it for you... or negotiate a long-term cooperation, and you commit that the production volume fluctuation is within plus or minus 15%." Li Lin (pseudonym), a power battery practitioner, told Future Auto Daily that for a long time in the past, there was a "capacity reservation and customer lock-in" cooperation model between power battery suppliers and OEMs. Capacity was prioritized for head customers who paid huge advance deposits, and only when there was spare capacity would production be scheduled for Tier-2 customers. Li Lin also revealed that CATL currently has about 10 Top Strategic Accounts, which enjoy rights such as dedicated product lines, joint laboratories, and small annual price reduction margins. Even in annual price reduction negotiations, Zeng Yuqun would personally step in to negotiate with them. But this only solves the supply relationship for ordinary power batteries. For the allocation right of CATL's high-end power batteries, it goes beyond the above simple relationship. In June 2022, CATL officially released the Qilin battery and seized the opportunity to shout the slogan "No Qilin battery, no premium EV." At that time, it was still half a year away from mass production, but Li Auto, Avatr, AITO, Neta, and Zeekr had already entered the fray to snatch the first-launch qualification. This first-launch screening was devoid of any emotional factors; the entire process was guided by commercial value. An insider from CATL revealed that in the first round of screening, CATL graded the above customers according to their cooperative relationships. Li Auto and Avatr were S-tier (Li Auto was once a head customer, and Avatr had a deep cooperative relationship) and given priority; Zeekr and AITO were A-tier (five-year strategic cooperative relationship, CATL participated in Zeekr's Pre-A round) and also considered; Neta was B-tier and directly eliminated. The second round deeply evaluated the launch pace and landing value of the customers' models. Ultimately, the Zeekr 009 not only got the first launch but also secured an early exclusivity period (not opening the same-spec Qilin pack to competitors in the short term), while AITO and Li Auto missed out on the first launch. "Besides having deep cooperation with CATL, Zeekr also went all out," said a Zeekr insider close to the cooperation. First, the initial production line capacity of the Qilin battery was extremely limited. Zeekr paid a large advance payment, directly locking in the first batch of mass production capacity for the first quarter of 2023. "Moreover, Zeekr was willing to cooperate with CATL to adjust the chassis and thermal management of the SEA platform for joint calibration." It is reported that to demonstrate that the SEA platform could maximize the energy efficiency of the Qilin battery, "Zeekr made a 50-page PPT." Another source revealed that to lock in the first launch of Qilin, Li Auto committed to CATL that CATL's share during the MEGA's lifecycle would be ≥70%, guaranteed a minimum purchase volume, and paid a partial advance deposit. "But CATL used the first-launch right to screen OEMs that were truly willing to bet their Tier-1 supplier share, rather than simply whoever spoke first," the source said. However, the final result was obvious to all. Compared to Li Auto, the conditions offered by Zeekr seemed more attractive to CATL. Since its debut in 2022, the Qilin battery has undergone two rounds of technological iteration, with its product power continuously advancing. This year, it officially launched the new Qilin Condensed Matter Battery, further raising the upper limit of high-end power battery technology. Even before the landing of the new technology, Li Auto and NIO locked in core capacity in advance, completing the forward positioning of high-end batteries: Li Auto finalized the dual-battery supporting plan of "Shenxing battery for hybrids, Qilin battery exclusively for pure EVs"; NIO's ET9 even secured the exclusive supporting qualification for the Qilin Condensed Matter Battery.
The priority supply rights of the two OEMs stem from their strategic cooperation foundation deeply bound with CATL. In terms of capacity, the joint venture factory between Li Auto and CATL will achieve an 8GWh capacity ramp-up in Q3 this year, stably ensuring the battery supply for models; in terms of ecology, NIO joined hands with CATL to land the European battery swap station co-construction plan, deepening long-term cooperation through overseas ecological synergy. Currently, the overall supply and demand in the power battery industry has tended to be loose, but the capacity of high-end scarce batteries such as Qilin and Condensed Matter remains tight. Looking back at the battery shortage cycle in 2021, Zeng Yuqun's remark "A promise without money is not serious" in the face of the industry's chaos of grabbing capacity remains the core criterion for high-end battery capacity allocation today: to seize top-tier battery technology and scarce capacity, the ultimate reliance is still a closer cooperative relationship. "You can find CATL to buy any battery, but the first-launch right of high-end batteries that can elevate product power cannot be bought with money," Li Lin said. "From CATL's perspective, the batteries we develop at great cost should deliver maximum value, rather than just playing the role of a commodity."
Tier-2 Manufacturers: Harmony Ensures Survival The industry conventionally divides CATL and FinDreams Battery, with annual installed capacity >150GWh and a combined domestic market share of about 60%-65%, into the first tier of power batteries; CALB (China Aviation Lithium Battery), Gotion High-Tech, EVE Energy, Sunwoda, and other enterprises with annual installed capacity usually between 20-150GWh and a combined domestic market share of about 15%-20% are regarded as the second tier. The timeless business logic of the trading field clearly divides two supplier postures: head players holding technological, capacity, and scale advantages stand firm in pricing, commercial terms, and supporting services, with very little concession in bargaining space; In contrast, Tier-2 battery manufacturers, struggling to grab the stock orders of the first-tier leaders, are generally willing to exchange more favorable quotes and more flexible supporting services for OEM order shares. In terms of quotes, for power batteries of the same specifications, the prices of Tier-2 suppliers are 10%-20% lower than CATL. For example, CALB's quote is about 10%-15% lower than CATL's, which corresponds to a savings of about 3,000-5,000 RMB per vehicle. Compared to FinDreams Battery, the quotes of Tier-2 suppliers are also about 10% cheaper. Moreover, Tier-2 suppliers are also willing to offer OEMs longer payment terms. "The payment terms for Tier-2 suppliers are generally between 80 and 160 days, and for their major clients, they will make further concessions." Some Tier-2 suppliers can even just supply cells to OEMs.
The OEMs pack them independently, which can also save the module packing premium. Relying solely on lower prices and shorter payment terms is not enough to make OEMs pay for them. In the second quarter of this year, a sub-brand of an OEM completed the replacement of its power battery supplier, with CALB and EVE Energy replacing FinDreams Battery as the main supporting suppliers. An insider close to this supply chain adjustment revealed that CALB and EVE Energy were more cost-effective in procurement pricing; the more critical contradiction lay in the division of rights and responsibilities for FinDreams Battery's external supply: it does not provide bottom-line quality assurance for externally supplied batteries. Once a cell fails, all after-sales costs and customer complaint risks must be borne by the OEM itself. Sunwoda's Chairman Wang Wei once stated that Tier-2 manufacturers cannot simply rely on low prices to grab orders; services must run through the entire lifecycle of the vehicle model to upgrade from a temporary Tier-2 supplier to a core strategic supplier. This means that behind all the industry jargon of joint R&D and deep synergy lies the simplest commercial relationship between Party A and Party B: the OEM is the absolute Party A, and the battery manufacturer is the replaceable Party B. All the "high-quality services" of Tier-2 manufacturers are essentially passive game means under the pressure of idle capacity. According to a Sunwoda insider, to cope with the supply anxiety caused by the battery shortage, Li Auto took the initiative to introduce Sunwoda as a Tier-2 supplier. At that time, Li Auto's self-developed PACK thermal management board had been finalized, requiring the positive and negative poles of the cells to be mirror-flipped compared to the original scheme. "The Changzhou base produced the modification plan within 48 hours, the first sample went offline within a week, and mass production started within a month." As a contrast, it takes CATL two months to go through the process for a design change of the same scale. Behind the efficiency gap is not a lack of technical capability of first-tier manufacturers, but different rule priorities. Head enterprises prioritize ensuring the order of standardized mass production and capacity utilization efficiency, and will not disrupt the overall rhythm for the customization needs of a single OEM; Tier-2 manufacturers have no order confidence and can only take "adapting to all needs of Party A" as the first principle. To consolidate orders, Tier-2 battery manufacturers have generally established an on-site AE (Application Engineer) system, which is also their core competitiveness distinguishing them from head manufacturers. Unlike the SLA (Service Level Agreement) service standards of first-tier manufacturers with remote docking and process-closed loops, the AE teams of Tier-2 manufacturers are supporting positions deeply embedded in the OEM system. In every link such as SOP (Start of Production) accompaniment for new OEM models and opening original data for joint debugging of BMS (Battery Management System), the on-site AEs must respond at all times. Relevant insiders revealed that it is normal for the AE group to be stationed at OEM factories for 3-6 months. Most companies stipulate that AE engineers must arrive at the OEM's production line or final assembly workshop within 2 hours, rather than the next day from another city. To this end, the HR departments of Tier-2 factories have also set up a "stationing allowance + family visit leave compensation" policy for the AE group.
"There is also a reimbursement of several hundred yuan every month, which can be used to invite OEM engineers for milk tea or coffee," the relevant insider said, adding that this is only to build a good relationship with the OEM Party A. As one of the Tier-2 players, after Volkswagen's investment, Gotion High-Tech's AE group strictly followed the German working hours (including German night meetings) and accompanied the project for nearly two years. An insider close to the project said that a Volkswagen auditor once requested the adjustment of the original data of self-discharge for a certain batch at 2 a.m. The AE members of Gotion's Hefei base exported a bilingual Chinese-German report from the system and sent it over within 30 minutes. This "midnight response" was later written into Gotion's internal training cases as the "standard action for German customers." More critical industry hidden rules are hidden in capacity. Insiders revealed that most Tier-2 power battery manufacturers will actively control their capacity utilization rate below 80%, deliberately retaining a portion of idle capacity. Unlike the business logic of head manufacturers who operate at full capacity and pursue the maximization of efficiency, Tier-2 manufacturers reserve redundant capacity for only one core purpose: to undertake the temporary increments, peak-season explosion orders, and model facelift fluctuations of OEMs, and to bottom out the supply chain risks for Party A. After providing all-round on-demand support for many years, Tier-2 factories have finally waited for their turning point: HIMA (Harmony Intelligent Mobility Alliance) began to comprehensively introduce suppliers other than CATL this year, and its three major brands, AITO, Luxeed, and Saic Shangjie, simultaneously introduced Gotion High-Tech, CALB, and Sunwoda. Tesla also included Sunwoda in its battery supply system this year. And to ensure sufficient capacity, "this year, most OEMs have signed procurement agreements of about 3 years with Tier-2 suppliers, and strategic procurement can even be signed until 2030," Li Lin revealed. OEMs taking the initiative to lock in long-term supply agreements with Tier-2 battery enterprises has clear cost considerations behind it: Tier-2 and Tier-3 battery manufacturers have more competitive quotes, and OEMs are also willing to divert some orders to support high-quality second-tier suppliers, thereby hedging against the bargaining advantages of head battery enterprises. Going for low prices and providing all-round on-demand support, Tier-2 battery manufacturers are frantically poaching from CATL. But even so, CATL remains the unrivaled oligarch in the industry. A very obvious example is right in front of us: BYD, the global NEV sales champion last year, has all its NEV models mainly powered by FinDreams Battery, but the global shipment champion of LFP (Lithium Iron Phosphate) batteries is CATL.
Shadow War CATL's discourse power in high-end batteries remains robust, and the "obedient" strategy of "Sunwoda and the like" has gradually grown into a stable Tier-2 supplier for OEMs. Within the product matrix of the same OEM, there has long been a clear price band barrier between CATL and Tier-2 battery manufacturers such as Sunwoda: High-end models priced above 300,000 RMB are uniformly equipped with CATL cells, relying on the stability, reputation, and technological endorsement of head batteries to support product premium and high-end positioning; while 100,000 RMB-level volume models are handed over to Tier-2 suppliers like Sunwoda to compress vehicle costs with high cost-performance battery solutions and consolidate volume advantages. CATL is happy to maintain this clear-cut pattern. "Low-end models have thin profits and are extremely sensitive to battery costs. Handing them over to Tier-2 manufacturers to undertake low-price involution allows CATL to avoid the brutal price war and maintain its gross profit margin," a CATL insider said. For CATL, its strategy is to take the initiative to give up some orders for low-end entry-level models and prioritize limited production lines for high value-added high-end cells. But one point that cannot be ignored is that the boundary between CATL and Tier-2 battery manufacturers has become blurred. In recent years, the phenomenon of randomly installing power batteries of different brands for the same model and the same configuration has become prominent. This is called the "A/B supplier" or "multi-supplier strategy" in the industry. A few years ago, this was still cold knowledge in the geek circle; now, it has become the standard for China's NEV industry. Statistics from Future Auto Daily show that among the top 20 best-selling models by sales volume, over 80% have adopted a dual- or triple-supplier strategy. This is the very simple logic of "not putting all eggs in one basket." Once Supplier A drops the ball, Supplier B must be able to step up immediately. "If CATL tells you they have no capacity, your new car can only be delayed in delivery, losing millions every day," a supply chain vice president of a new force OEM told Future Auto Daily. The vice president also revealed the unspoken rules behind OEMs opening Tier-2 suppliers: some OEMs will require Tier-2 suppliers to complete the compatibility audit, PPAP documents, and small-batch trial production of relevant power batteries in advance, but the MIIT announcement and press releases will only list CATL. As long as CATL's capacity allocation falls short in a certain quarter or a certain base is under maintenance, Tier-2 factories will be immediately activated to fill the gap. This operation is called "shadow nomination" in the industry. "What the outside world sees is just a sudden battery change, but in fact, the cooperation between the two has been covertly intervening for 3-6 months." NEV OEMs use Tier-2 suppliers to maintain capacity balance, but this balance is actually just dancing within the circle drawn by giants. CATL naturally knows about the OEMs' behind-the-scenes moves.
"Even if customers divert low-end orders, as long as the long-term agreement guarantees the minimum purchase volume for high-end models, CATL will not tighten cooperation," a CATL insider added. But if CATL finds that OEMs are continuously compressing its share, it will naturally take countermeasures. For example, cutting the quota for high-end batteries such as Qilin and Shenxing; raising supply prices; or even prioritizing more cutting-edge power battery opportunities for customers with stable shares. Of course, OEMs will also compress CATL's share for profit reasons, as mentioned above, the quotes of Tier-2 power battery manufacturers are about 10% or more lower than CATL's. In this wave of price wars in 2026, 10% is the watershed for whether OEMs can turn losses into profits. "You can't just look at the price." The above CATL insider admitted that CATL's batteries are indeed more expensive, but opening Tier-2 suppliers also corresponds to some hidden costs. CATL stipulates that OEMs opening Tier-2 suppliers must develop and match the BMS separately for different cells, and cannot simply apply CATL's BMS parameters. Otherwise, problems such as bulging and abnormal attenuation are prone to occur. This part of the cost is also easily ignored by the procurement department in the early stage, but it corresponds to a cost of 20 million to 40 million RMB. CATL insiders also revealed that the attenuation of some Tier-2 batteries at minus 15 degrees Celsius is about 5-10 percentage points higher than CATL's, which requires compensation in the vehicle's thermal management strategy. "Expensive has its reasons," the CATL insider said. For CATL, Tier-2 power battery enterprises have a "love-hate" relationship with it. They love it for making the power battery industry cake bigger and making OEMs realize the need for Tier-2 suppliers—without the rise of CATL, Tier-2 factories wouldn't even have the chance to enter the OEM supply chain. They hate CATL for holding the pricing power and patent barriers. In an interview with Caijing Magazine, Zeng Yuqun also mentioned the current chaos of price wars among power battery manufacturers. "Others imitate you, and the level of imitation may be 60% to 70%, but they just use low prices to compete." Zeng Yuqun took photovoltaics as an example. Although the domestic photovoltaic industry has firmly stood at the global forefront, it is generally thinly profitable, and the root cause lies in insufficient intellectual property protection and vicious low-price competition in the industry. In his view, the reason the lithium battery industry has not yet fallen into the same quagmire relies on CATL's maintenance of the price system; if it takes the initiative to lower its pricing, the industry's survival environment will be more severe than that of photovoltaics. The NEV market has already verified the harm of disorderly price wars, with rising sales but continuously shrinking profits. Perhaps to some extent, once CATL joins the all-out price war, power batteries may become the third red ocean track deeply trapped in involution after photovoltaics and NEVs.
Learning by Doing The development of China's auto industry is essentially a "growth history." CATL's old factory area was initially renovated from old factories. R&D personnel set up racks in simple laboratories to test cycle life, and some equipment was transferred from the ATL (Amperex Technology Limited) Dongguan base—this is completely different from the later headquarters with a trillion-dollar market value. Gotion High-Tech started in a small workshop in Hefei, EVE Energy's Liu Jincheng started doing lithium sub-batteries by renting a small factory in Huizhou, Sunwoda started as a civil house processing factory, and in the early days of entrepreneurship, "if wages couldn't be paid, they were owed"... But they have now all grown into giants capable of competing with international power battery enterprises. Whenever the heads of these power battery companies recall their struggle history, they always emphasize those luxury automakers. The initial cooperation between CATL and BMW (Brilliance BMW) in 2012 was the true starting point of the entire "Ning Wang" (Battery King) story. At that time, BMW only promised a procurement amount of 170 million RMB, far lower than the commercial vehicle large orders of the same period. But what Zeng Yuqun bet on was the "BMW endorsement" rather than profits. On March 21, 2017, at the launch press conference of Brilliance BMW Zinoro 60H, the president of Brilliance BMW, Johann Weichenberger, invited Zeng Yuqun to share the story of their cooperation. Brilliance BMW submitted a power battery system requirement specification document of over 700 pages to CATL, detailing the energy and power requirements under different working conditions, and hundreds of quality management requirements. The two parties set up a joint battery development team of over 100 people, covering all key technical fields of the battery pack such as cells, system architecture, mechanical design, testing and verification, and quality management. "Later, when BAIC, Changan, and Geely came to audit the factory, CATL directly displayed it according to this German template, which was a step ahead of domestic peers," a CATL insider said. "For these old-school automakers, especially the logical process of German manufacturing, they need to get things right the first time. Their requirements are relatively high, and they also have extremely high requirements for vehicle safety."
In the cooperation with Mercedes-Benz, CATL did not seem as strong as usual. According to Mercedes-Benz's requirements, Mercedes-Benz needs to conduct independent sampling and re-testing (self-discharge rate, DCR (Direct Current Resistance) growth, capacity accuracy) for each batch of samples, and the Mercedes-Benz laboratory can reject the batch. CATL accepted this "buyer's re-inspection right," while domestic frameworks usually only recognize the factory COA (Certificate of Analysis / quality inspection certificate). Mercedes-Benz is also regarded by a group of suppliers as one of the most stringent supplier access systems in the world. Entering the Mercedes-Benz supplier system requires meeting the requirements of the German VDA 6.3 audit, UN ECE certification, and the EU new battery law carbon footprint traceability. In CATL's view, winning Mercedes-Benz means obtaining the trust endorsement of global luxury automakers, which has a much higher brand premium than simply getting orders from domestic new forces. CATL grew rapidly through cooperation with international giants, while those Tier-2 enterprises "crossed the river by feeling CATL." A Tier-2 power battery company once poached CATL's backbone in stacking/electrolyte injection/formation processes at a high salary, just to reproduce CATL's process control window, and these data do not belong to the formula protected by patents. "They know which data is sensitive and which parameters can be appropriately relaxed. These parameters can effectively improve the yield rate." Some Tier-2 suppliers, in order to avoid the patent protection of CATL, will also cooperate with CATL's equipment manufacturers in the form of joint development, so that they can indirectly understand the unified landing standard hardware, performance indicators, and functional configuration range of the competitor's product line, and then reverse engineer accordingly. Compared to these Tier-2 battery suppliers, CATL's annual R&D investment is 5 times that of Sunwoda and more than 9 times that of Gotion High-Tech. In the first three quarters of 2025 alone, CATL's R&D investment of 15.068 billion RMB has far exceeded the annual R&D budget of Tier-2 enterprises. These real-money investments have exchanged for technological leadership: in 2023, CATL released the 4C Shenxing LFP superfast charging battery, which opened up the mass production path of LFP superfast charging at once, driving the whole industry to start the wave of LFP superfast charging technology R&D and installation. It has also exchanged for stricter R&D and manufacturing standards in the power battery industry. LatePost previously reported that CATL has a special audit team of 500 people internally.
The core job of these engineers is only one: to find out the omissions and defects in each business link. Whenever the business department has objections to the rectification opinions, the person in charge needs to explain the reasons directly to Zeng Yuqun in person. Zeng Yuqun bluntly said that these 500 people are the most unpopular group in the company, and their biggest backer is himself. He once reviewed the development context of the industry in public: lithium battery technology originated in Japan, the scale expansion of industrialization was completed by South Korean enterprises, and it was finally the Chinese industry that brought power batteries to the world's top level. Looking back at the complete development process of the industry, it is not difficult to find that the core competitiveness of the industry has never been the eye-catching parameters on paper, but the countless rounds of repeated experiments, iterative trial and error hidden behind the scenes, and the complete set of manufacturing standards precipitated under the grinding of OEMs' stringent requirements.
The rise logic of the domestic power battery industry is clearly traceable: first humbly learn advanced overseas technology and play the role of a supporting supplier, then establish a deeply synergistic partnership with OEMs. Only after a long cycle of precipitation can the industry truly grasp the discourse power of the industry chain. —End—