Original Title: Volkswagen, Coming from "Overseas," is Now Going Global Too
Yesterday, at the World New Energy Vehicle Conference in Haikou, Ralf Brandstätter, CEO of Volkswagen China, delivered a keynote speech titled "Rooted in China, Going Global for the Long Run." Three years ago, his theme was "In China, for China," but this time he added a second half: In China, Beyond China, shouting out the slogan of "Rooted in China, Going Global for the Long Run."
A German company that has been selling cars in China for 42 years is now starting to export China-made vehicles overseas. Five years ago, no one would have believed this. In 1984, the Santana was imported via CKD (Completely Knocked Down), with even the screws shipped from Germany; now, SAIC Volkswagen is shipping the Teramont and Passat Pro to Tashkent, while FAW-Volkswagen's Magotan and Sagitar are heading to the Middle East. The direction has been reversed.
Why is Volkswagen Also Going Global?
The most direct reason: business in the domestic market is getting tougher.
The figures Ralf Brandstätter presented in his speech were quite blunt. China's passenger car market is expected to decline by about 20% in 2026, falling back to around 20 million units, which is 4.5 million units less than in 2025, an impact equivalent to the pandemic at that time. The industry's average profit margin has dropped to 1.5%. A new car model reaches its sales peak just three months after launch, and then consumers move on to the next one; the product cycle has been compressed from seven years to three years, with over 500 new or facelifted models launched this year.
Regional deliveries and guidance are from Volkswagen Group's 2026 semi-annual report (July 24); joint venture equity profits are calculated on an equity method basis.
Volkswagen's own financials look even worse. In the first half of the year, the group delivered about 970,000 units in China, a year-on-year decrease of 25.9%, falling deeper than the overall market; the operating profit of Chinese joint ventures accounted for under the equity method shrank from 506 million euros in the same period last year to 184 million euros. In the past, Chinese joint ventures were a stable source of profit and dividends for the group, and they didn't take up much space in the consolidated balance sheet. Now, the return capability of this model is dropping rapidly. The group's global capacity has been compressed from 12 million units to 9 million units, and the factories in Nanjing, Ningbo Plant 1, and Urumqi have already been closed.
Domestic market forecasts are based on Ralf Brandstätter's speech; export data is from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM) for January to August 2026, released on September 10.
Capacity sits idle, but fixed costs remain. Where to go?
On the other side is the explosion of China's exports. According to CAAM data, from January to August this year, auto exports reached 7.153 million units, a year-on-year increase of 66.7%, surpassing the full-year 2025 total of 7.098 million units in just eight months; August exports hit 1.01 million units, exceeding one million for three consecutive months, with NEVs accounting for over half for three consecutive months. The year-on-year decline in domestic monthly sales has exceeded 20% for five consecutive months, making exports the incremental growth that stabilizes the overall industry market.
Of course, none of the domestic joint venture peers are just sitting around.
In June, Nissan shipped 900 units of the Frontier Pro to Latin America. In September, two ships set sail within two days, heading to the Gulf and Southeast Asia respectively, with the N7 also on board;
Ford exported 184,000 units from China in 2025, selling to over 70 countries, and the Transit City has just entered Europe;
SAIC-GM's Buick Zhijing E7 plans to export to the Middle East, Africa, and South America in October;
Toyota is even planning to reverse-export its domestically produced Lexus models.
Volkswagen Anhui's CUPRA Tavascan has been continuously shipping to Europe. In February this year, the EU accepted its price commitment, making it the first company to receive an individual exemption after the final countervailing duty ruling.
Export actions of various companies are from company announcements and media reports (September 2025 – September 2026); Tesla's export volume is based on the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA) caliber.
So the word "also" is very accurate. It is not that Volkswagen was the first to think of going global, but rather that the Chinese market leaves no way out, the export channel happens to be open, and the joint venture camp is pivoting collectively; Volkswagen has no reason not to follow. Volkswagen revealed that "further expanding vehicle and technology-related export business" is listed as one of the current three major directions, the other two being ensuring new car deliveries and reducing costs. Putting exports and cost reduction together shows that this is not just an image project; the math has definitely been done.
What Enables Volkswagen to Go Global Too?
Many joint ventures want to go global, but only a few can. In the past, joint ventures were merely Chinese assembly plants for global models, with product definition rights and technical release authority held at the headquarters; exporting a single car model required asking Wolfsburg first. What Volkswagen has done over the past three years is precisely to break this chain.
Volkswagen (China) Technology Co., Ltd. in Hefei, with over 3,000 R&D personnel, is Volkswagen's largest R&D center outside Germany. Decision-making and final approvals are completed locally, possessing independent technical release authority. This point was briefly mentioned in the speech, but it is the prerequisite for going global: whether the car can be modified, how it should be modified, and which market to sell it in are all decided by the Chinese team itself. The model selection and channel planning for the SAIC Volkswagen Uzbekistan project are both led by the Chinese team, which has never happened before.
Let's look at what they have in hand. Complete vehicle platforms, E/E (Electrical/Electronic) architectures, and intelligent driving—Ralf Brandstätter calls it the "local technology matrix," all developed in China. The CEA architecture was jointly developed with XPeng and CARIAD China, reaching mass production in 18 months, with the number of controllers reduced by 30% compared to the original, applicable to BEVs, PHEVs, and ICE vehicles; the goal of the CMP platform is to reduce costs by 40% compared to MEB; CARIZON's HyperSense8 has a training mileage of over 100 million kilometers, aiming for L3 by 2027. There is also GAIA 2.0, a world model that processes 4TB of data daily, equivalent to driving 10,000 kilometers on real roads, increasing R&D speed by up to 50 times.
These things were forged through fierce competition in the Chinese market, with costs and iteration speeds calibrated to Chinese standards. When placed in the Middle East, Central Asia, and ASEAN, the competitors are the same batch of Chinese brands, not the old European friends. Whether it is enough to fight will depend on sales, but at least it is no longer about using the decade-old MQB to compete against BYD.
There are also tangible results. In September 2025, the first batch of 554 Magotan and Sagitar units for Middle East export rolled off the production line at the FAW-Volkswagen Changchun base, achieving a breakthrough from 0 to 1; in June 2026, Volkswagen and Jetta entered Uzbekistan, marking the first time the Volkswagen brand in China has fully managed its export business; in July, a partnership with Kazakh dealer Orbis was announced, and on August 19, seven Volkswagen and Jetta models were launched simultaneously in Kazakhstan; by the end of the year, Jetta VS5 and VS7 will begin SKD assembly in Tashkent. Over at SAIC Volkswagen, the Tiguan L Pro, Passat Pro, and Teramont series have already been displayed at the inauguration site of the new Tashkent factory. FAW-Volkswagen has also established an overseas business department to coordinate the full-chain export of the Audi, Volkswagen, and Jetta brands.
Within a year, from the Middle East to Central Asia, from a single brand to dual brands, from complete vehicles to SKD. It may not be fast compared to Chinese brands, but it is already very fast compared to Volkswagen itself.
The timeline is from Volkswagen (China), FAW-Volkswagen announcements, and Xinhua Net reports; target markets are marked according to the overseas layout map on page 22 of Ralf Brandstätter's speech PPT; base map by Natural Earth.
What Advantages Does Volkswagen Have in Going Global?
Compared to Chinese brands that have been fighting overseas for several years, the cards Volkswagen holds are different.
The first card is the brand. The most expensive thing for Chinese automakers going global is building trust from scratch, which Volkswagen doesn't need to do. In markets like Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and the Middle East, the reputation of German engineering is readily available. FAW-Volkswagen dares to let Jetta lead the charge, relying on the recognition of "German quality, Chinese price" in emerging markets. Among the launch orders for the ID. AURA T6, nearly 8,000 people switched from non-joint venture brands, placing orders because they recognize German quality. This is the case domestically, and it will only be more pronounced in emerging markets.
The second card is the network. Volkswagen already has sales and service systems in the Middle East, South America, South Africa, India, and ASEAN. China-made cars can be directly integrated into existing channels, without the need to set up stores country by country like Chinese brands. The overseas layout map on Ralf Brandstätter's PPT circles Central Asia, the Middle East, India, ASEAN, South America, South Africa, and Oceania—all places where Volkswagen already has a presence.
The third card is walking on two legs: ICE and NEV. The reality in Global South markets is that ICE vehicles still account for the majority, and BEV penetration is slow. Volkswagen's market share in China's ICE vehicle market is 22%, and the main exports to Central Asia are precisely ICE vehicles like the Tiguan L Pro, Passat Pro, and Tayron; meanwhile, the CEA architecture will cover ICE and hybrid models starting in 2027, meaning the intelligent capabilities developed by the Chinese team can be installed on ICE vehicles and sold together. Most of the Chinese brands going global are BEVs or PHEVs; very few can use "ICE vehicles plus intelligence" to compete in emerging markets.
The fourth card is joint venture partners and policies. FAW-Volkswagen is the only auto joint venture in China controlled by a central state-owned enterprise. Jetta's export relies on the Chengdu International Railway Port, and the Tashkent project was unveiled in front of the presidents of Germany and Uzbekistan. Such resources cannot be bought through market competition.
There is one more thing: exports are not just about complete vehicles. Ralf Brandstätter explicitly stated that they will rely on local platforms and the CEA architecture to meet the demands of the Global South markets, which is technology export. The relationship between Volkswagen China and Wolfsburg is shifting from one-way input to two-way synergy, with R&D from China feeding back into the group. If this step is successfully taken, the significance of the China region to Volkswagen will truly be more than just a market.
However, let's not overstate it. The export volume of Volkswagen Anhui is currently very small; the first batch from FAW-Volkswagen to the Middle East was only 554 units, while Tesla exported 229,000 units from China in the first half of the year. Joint ventures going global still face a natural hurdle: the global capacity arrangement of the foreign headquarters. While Ford introduces the Lincoln Corsair hybrid from China, it simultaneously announced that it will gradually phase out Lincoln exports from China to the US starting in 2030. No matter how competitive the Chinese supply is, it must yield to the group's overall layout. Volkswagen's European factories are reducing production and closing down. How many China-made cars can enter Volkswagen's own global market ultimately depends on how much business space Wolfsburg is willing to provide. CFO Arno Antlitz admitted in the semi-annual report that Chinese automakers going global has already brought pressure to Europe, and Volkswagen's existing measures are not enough. Reading this sentence in reverse also holds true: if they don't bring out this Chinese speed and cost structure, it will be Volkswagen itself that gets squeezed.
Comparison dimensions are summarized by this article; European market share data is from Dataforce, and Ford Lincoln arrangements are from company announcements and media reports.
42 years ago, Volkswagen brought cars into China; now, China is taking Volkswagen out. The word "also" contains a bit of passivity, but more of clarity. What do you think of Volkswagen, the leader among foreign-invested automakers, going global? Welcome to leave a comment and discuss.
References and Images
- [PPT] Keynote Speech by Ralf Brandstätter, Chairman and CEO of Volkswagen Group (China), at the 2026 World New Energy Vehicle Conference
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