Author | Lu Yao Editor | Liu Wei
01. The Wall
"We are not pursuing the North American market anymore. We will continue selling existing products, but there will be no new launches."
This was the stance taken by a leading smart hardware company when Zhou Ming, head of a sensor firm, recently visited them. According to his observations, several top cleaning appliance manufacturers are shifting their new product plans toward Europe and Australia.
The trigger for this pause was a list issued on July 28. The US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) added "foreign-produced advanced robotic equipment" to its Covered List. Although the list did not name specific products, based on the definition—autonomous movement, equipped with sensors, network connectivity, and navigation software—robot vacuums, wireless lawn mowing robots, and wireless pool cleaning robots largely qualify.
The rule applies a "grandfather clause": previously authorized models can continue to be sold, and safety software updates are exempted until at least January 1, 2029; new models generally cannot obtain device authorization unless they receive "conditional approval" from the Department of Defense or achieve domestic manufacturing in the US (from 2024–2028, the cost share of US and designated source components must exceed 65%, rising to 75% starting in 2029).
On September 9, the first "conditional approval" was granted to Swedish company Husqvarna, allowing a batch of Automower lawn mowing robots to enter the US market.
As the North American market tightens, manufacturers' attention naturally turns to Europe, but this market is also seeing new trade barriers emerge.
On the evening of October 21, in Brussels, the European Commission issued a final disclosure document prior to definitive measures regarding the anti-dumping investigation into lawn mowing robots originating from China, sending it to all interested parties: proposed anti-dumping duties range from 45.6% to 53.3%. Mammotion faces 45.6%, Positec faces 53.3%, other cooperating companies face 47.0%, and non-cooperating companies face a uniform 53.3%. These rates are calculated based on CIF prices, with a tendency against retroactive collection. This is merely a disclosure; the statutory deadline for final measures is January 19, 2027, with an intervening comment period and opportunities for corporate defense.
Why are the tariffs so high? The key lies in the European Commission's determination of product costs. In this investigation, 39 Chinese companies submitted questionnaires, but citing "significant distortions" in the Chinese market, the Commission did not accept the actual costs reported by Chinese firms, instead using Malaysia as a surrogate country to calculate normal value.
Behind this investigation, a set of market change data is noteworthy. According to the disclosure documents, the market impact recognized by the Commission is severe: from 2022 to the investigation period, the EU market share of Chinese-made lawn mowing robots rose from nearly 50% to 79.2%; meanwhile, complainant Husqvarna's share fell from a peak of 70% to around 50% by 2025, with its growth focus shifting to the commercial market.
The rapid shift in market share is a critical backdrop to this trade dispute.
However, facing the same rise of Chinese manufacturers, different companies find themselves in distinct situations. For traditional players like Positec, Zhou Ming observed that they have not shown particularly intense anxiety.
The reason lies in differing market structures. Positec's primary revenue comes from the commercial market, where a single commercial mower can sell for hundreds of thousands of yuan, equivalent to several home-use units. "They do not yet view these domestic manufacturers as competitors," he noted.
Looking back at the growth of Chinese manufacturers in recent years, the surge in lawn mowing robots initially capitalized on the opportunity of "switching from gasoline to electric," further boosted by the "lazy economy" validated by robot vacuums. Existing product logic and supply chain advantages were rapidly replicated. The subsequent rise of pool cleaning robots followed the same playbook.
This strategy has indeed worked in the past, driving several years of rapid growth for Chinese manufacturers through cost advantages, supply chain efficiency, e-commerce platform traffic, product value-for-money, and overseas distributor networks.
Now, North America raises entry barriers, blocking new products with one wall; Europe raises operating costs, squeezing profits with another. However, while the walls are built from the outside, the cracks start from within. (For discussions on channels and sales velocity for cleaning robots going global, feel free to add WeChat MOON_ERS.)
02. Sell-in is Visible, Sell-out is Hidden
If trade policies have changed the external operating environment for Chinese outdoor robotics companies, then channel inventory and terminal sales velocity represent another challenge the industry is facing internally.
In industry statistics, "sell-in" typically refers to shipments from manufacturers to distributors and channel partners; "sell-out" refers to sales from channels to end consumers. The former reflects manufacturer sales performance, while the latter is closer to true terminal demand.
On the surface, industry data still looks impressive. IDC reports that global shipments of lawn mowing robots reached 1.992 million units in 2025, a year-on-year increase of 63.8%; among these, boundary-less models accounted for1.318 million units, growing 182.4% and representing 66.2% of the total, with the top six vendors all being Chinese companies. However, shipment volume does not exactly equal consumer purchase volume.
Changes have already appeared in the pool cleaning robot market, with this year's peak season underperforming.
IDC data shows that during the traditional peak season of Q2 2026, global shipments were approximately 1.533 million units, a year-on-year decline of 6.3%. For pool cleaning devices, which typically exhibit strong seasonal characteristics, this data has drawn attention from supply chain enterprises.
Gu Yan, head of a sensor supplier for pool robots, stated that the main brands currently in the market include Ecovacs, Dreame, Xingmai, Mammotion, Wangyuan, Yuanding, and about five to seven other companies. In his view, the technical routes of various companies are converging. Brands that previously targeted only the high-end market have begun launching products in the $300-$400 price range. "The so-called room for innovation has shrunk," he said.
As product competition intensifies, inventory pressure begins to transmit upstream to the supply chain.
Gu Yan revealed that a significant portion of products sold in the market this year came from last year's inventory. "Previously, we might produce10,000 units of a new model; this year, we might only produce 5,000 because one-third to half of last year's inventory remains unsold."
This change is already reflected in orders from upstream suppliers.
Taking sensors used in pool robots as an example, Gu Yan noted, "Shipments of certain LiDAR products reached 20,000 units last year, but orders this year may drop to zero; shipments of lower-cost ultrasonic and single-point sensors have fallen from 300,000–400,000 units to around 200,000 units."
In his judgment, the pool robot market may need about two more years to form a relatively stable competitive landscape. By then, market share and supply chain resources may further concentrate among a few players.
So why does the industry discuss shipment volumes rather than terminal sales velocity?
Lu Ming, an analyst at a leading market research firm, explained that while specialized institutions exist overseas for tracking terminal retail data, "Sell-out data is extremely expensive compared to sell-in data," and pricing varies by country. "There is little time to verify data accuracy once obtained, and overseas data has blind spots—for instance, some products are shipped directly from China, making them difficult for overseas channels to track."
For companies needing to schedule production, stocking, and overseas logistics in advance, acquiring and verifying terminal sales data has become a cost in business decision-making. "Rather than buying a pile of fake data leading to stocking errors, it is better to pay for accurate data."
Inventory data from listed companies provides another observational angle.
Q3 2026 financial reports show that Ecovacs' ending inventory stood at CNY 5.41 billion, up approximately 66% from the beginning of the year; Roborock's ending inventory was CNY 6.263 billion, up approximately 136% from the end of the previous year, with inventory turnover days increasing from 104.7 to 133.9 days. Combined, the two companies hold over CNY 11.6 billion in inventory.
Of course, these figures are consolidated report metrics, encompassing different product lines and businesses such as robot vacuums, lawn mowers, and pool cleaners. Both companies offer consistent explanations for inventory changes: proactive stocking due to rising component prices (such as memory chips), combined with overseas business expansion.
However, industry respondents believe inventory pressure exists not only in manufacturers' warehouses.
Cheng Li, an industry veteran who previously managed channels and operations at a top cleaning appliance company, pointed out that for some companies, the inventory digestion cycle could take two to three years. "Even if we stop production in the second half of the year, we might not sell it all, and some stagnant old inventory can only be discounted. Assuming CNY 4 billion in inventory, handling storage fees, logistics costs, marketing expenses, and markdowns would likely require CNY 500 million to 1 billion just to clear it. If you count distributor and supplier inventory, you might need to multiply by 1.5 or even 2."
Inventory management appears to be a sales issue but fundamentally tests a company's organizational capabilities. In Cheng Li's view, "Boosting revenue and controlling inventory are two different things. Only a very small number of well-managed companies can balance both. Having the right marketing lead early on is also crucial."
Shipments are rising, inventory is rising, but peak season sales are falling. Is this industry truly growing, or simply moving goods from manufacturers' warehouses to distributors' warehouses?
03. Acquiring Channels to Secure Entry Points, But Then What?
With two walls externally and inventory internally, some Chinese companies have found a third path: acquiring local brands and channel networks.
On October 7, Ldrobot announced its intention to acquire 100% equity in German garden equipment manufacturer SABO through its wholly-owned Singapore subsidiary ANTHBOT, with a total investment not exceeding EUR 6 million. Notably, the equity consideration is only EUR 1 million. SABO's revenue in 2025 was approximately EUR 18.2 million.
SABO is a German garden equipment brand with nearly a century of history, possessing a sales network comprising over 1,400 professional retailers locally. From public transaction information, this acquisition involves not just brand assets but also SABO's existing channels and market resources.
Industry insider Feng Bin observed that the actual value of this deal lies in two aspects: publishing PR articles and securing channels. "Mainly, they are using its channels," he said.
It is understood that 70–80% of SABO's channels are concentrated in Germany. Germany is one of the important garden equipment markets in Europe, with relatively high consumer purchasing power and price levels. Compared to Southern European markets like Italy and Spain, and parts of Eastern Europe, Germany and Northern Europe have always been key regions for high-end garden equipment companies.
For Chinese companies hoping to further expand in Europe, acquiring a long-established local brand allows them to simultaneously gain brand recognition, distributor relationships, after-sales service networks, and a user base.
This differs from the past approach of gradually opening markets via e-commerce platforms, overseas advertising, and distributors. From a market entry efficiency perspective, M&A shortens the brand and channel construction cycle; from an operational capability perspective, local teams and after-sales networks support product sales.
However, acquiring channel resources does not mean market operation issues are resolved.
SABO represents buyer logic. Feng Qian, founder of a pool robot startup, calculates seller accounts.
In 2026, he began seriously considering a question: If a traditional home appliance or channel company is willing to take over, at what price should the company be sold? His answer: "Two to three times P/S (Price-to-Sales ratio), and we can talk."
After exiting the Amazon North America channel, he shifted the business focus to ODM, agency services, and upstream gyroscope modules, aiming to first achieve tens of millions in revenue before seeking M&A or other capital operation opportunities.
In his view, the pool robot market size is limited, many investment institutions have completed their positioning, and channels, brands, and funds are concentrating among a few players. For startups, the window to independently penetrate overseas markets is closing. Continuing to invest independently in building brands and channels may not be the only choice.
On one side, Chinese companies are acquiring established European brands to gain local channel resources; on the other, startup founders are beginning to consider selling their companies to firms with channel and industrial resources.
Brand integration is not easy. For multinational corporations, after acquiring a local brand, they must still address distributor relationship maintenance, local team management, after-sales system integration, and product adaptation: distributors may not just recognize the brand but also value the original business leads and cooperative relationships; decision-making and management mechanisms between the Chinese headquarters and overseas teams need to be re-established.
Furthermore, beyond the acquisition price, there are subsequent integration costs. If the product itself lacks competitiveness, even acquiring a mature sales network may not result in sustained sales velocity.
Feng Bin also revealed that a certain lawn mower brand already has "heavily pressured" channel inventory, but according to performance planning, "channels will still need to absorb a wave of inventory at the end of this year and the beginning of next year"; if they cannot absorb it, the company will open new channels and regions.
The motivation for pushing inventory does not come entirely from terminal demand but is also influenced by corporate revenue targets, performance planning, and capital market expectations.
This phenomenon has drawn attention to some cooperation orders and technology launches in the industry.
Some cooperation orders involving hundreds of thousands of units and some new technology announcements differ significantly from actual implementation versus promotion, "mostly serving as PR articles," he noted.
Connecting these actions reveals a cycle: valuation and performance pressures drive manufacturers to push inventory; when channels cannot sustain it, they open new channels or acquire them; acquired channels then become the destination for the next round of inventory pushing.
A sensor supplier observing from the frontline sees the other side of this cycle: Many companies enter lawn mowers and pool robots because they need new categories to supplement revenue; when high-end models don't sell, they produce mid-to-low-end machines priced at $300-$400 to prop up numbers. In his words, this expansion is forced by growth pressure, not pulled by user demand.
04. Conclusion
There is a verse in "Strategies of the Warring States": "A journey of a hundred miles is only half complete at ninety."
For this industry, the ninety miles traveled represent supply chain, value-for-money, and e-commerce traffic. What constitutes the remaining ten miles can be answered by a simpler question: Has the goods actually been sold to consumers?
A product chain travels four segments: from factory shipment to channel warehouse, then to retail shelf placement, and finally to consumer purchase. Most of the beautiful numbers circulating in the industry today reflect only the first two segments.
What truly determines a company's quality are the latter two segments: whether channel inventory is rising, whether terminal discounts are widening, whether return rates are increasing, whether distributors are willing to replenish stock, and whether users are repurchasing and referring others.
Shipment volume indicates goods were sold to channels; sales velocity indicates the market has truly accepted the product.
In the deep waters of the industry, data can be bought, but trust cannot be traded.