The issue of payment terms is merely an amplified shadow.
Recently, a netizen replied to a post titled "What information is worth noting regarding the CAAM's survey and evaluation of supplier payment accounts for 17 key automakers?" with the following message:
"Yesterday, I received a tender from an automaker, estimated at around CNY 20 million for calibration. Requirements: 1. Bid bond of CNY 560,000; 2. No advance payment or shipment payment, payment only after acceptance; 3. The principle of bid evaluation is lowest price wins." He stated that under these requirements, he would need to front CNY 15 million in capital, with no guaranteed timeline for repayment.
What was even more surprising was the reaction to this netizen's information. No one questioned its authenticity; instead, everyone agreed it reflected the industry status quo.
This indicates that long payment terms, heavy capital advances, and lowest-price bidding are not isolated issues affecting individual companies but rather unwritten rules that have become commonplace in the industry. It also demonstrates that the supply chain ecosystem has deteriorated to a point where such practices are universally accepted by default, making regulatory surveys and rectification efforts all the more necessary.
Consequently, on November 16, the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM) issued a notice launching a survey and evaluation of supplier payment accounts among automobile enterprises. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) responded that systematic surveys and evaluations will be conducted annually, with results published.
It should be noted that the issue of automakers' supplier payments has undergone three phases of advancement so far. According to media statistics based on listed company financial reports, the average turnover days for accounts payable and notes payable of 14 mainstream listed automakers in the first half of 2026 remained at 187.5 days, rebounding by 23.1 days compared to the end of 2025. This indicates a significant gap between nominal and actual payment terms.
In other words, this issue has reached a stage requiring strong regulatory intervention.
01Overseeing a Few Means Managing the Majority
Many people understand that the issue of supplier payment terms goes beyond simple honest business conduct; behind it lies the health of the entire automotive industry ecosystem. This article will not elaborate on the specific details within the evaluation content but aims to explore the significance of these 17 automakers to the Chinese automotive market.
The 17 key enterprises included in the CAAM's assessment cover FAW, SAIC, Dongfeng, Changan, GAC, BAIC, Chery, JAC, Great Wall Motor, Geely, BYD, SERES, as well as Li Auto, NIO, XPeng, Xiaomi, and Leapmotor. They essentially encompass all major players, ranging from traditional giants to leading new energy vehicle startups.
Looking back, in June 2025, these 17 automakers publicly committed to keeping payment terms within 60 days. More than a year later, regulators returned to verify compliance through routine assessments. The recurrence of this situation sends a clear signal: controlling these 17 companies means controlling the fundamental landscape of the Chinese auto market.
To put it another way, the weight of these 17 automakers is most directly reflected in sales concentration. Their combined share may well exceed 70%. Given that domestic brands already hold over 70% of the passenger car market share, these 17 companies are the primary and most direct carriers of this share.
However, holding a large market share does not automatically equate to health. The most obvious contrast in the Chinese auto market in recent years is the divergence between scale and profit. In the first half of 2026, domestic auto sales totaled 15.017 million units, down 4.1% year-on-year; total industry profits amounted to CNY 195.35 billion, down 19.5% year-on-year, with revenue profit margins dropping to 3.8%. While sales declined slightly, profits shrank significantly, indicating that the industry is generating revenue without increasing profitability.
The vehicle manufacturing segment fared even worse. In the first half of the year, the average profit margin for domestic vehicle manufacturing fell to 1.5%, a ten-year low. Based on this calculation, selling a new car priced at CNY 100,000 yields only about CNY 1,500 in profit for the manufacturer. Over 130 brands are engaged in fierce competition within a contracting market, with terminal prices continuously falling. Automakers dare not raise prices to maintain market share, resulting in profits being squeezed from both sides.
Trading price for volume has become the mainstream practice in the current auto market, which directly leads to dealers bleeding losses due to negative gross margins (price inversion). In 2025, over 80% of national dealers faced price inversion, with the loss ratio expanding to 55.7%. The gross profit contribution from new car sales dropped as low as -25.5%, and nearly 5,000 4S stores closed or suspended operations throughout the year.
When losses at the sales end of automobile enterprises transmit upstream, supplier payment terms become an outlet for shifting pressure. Behaviors such as delaying payments to small and medium-sized enterprises, substituting cash with bills of exchange, and indirectly extending payment cycles by delaying acceptance inspections collectively erode the credit foundation and reinvestment capacity of the entire industrial chain.
It is important to note that upstream suppliers in the automotive industry are experiencing divergent survival conditions. Top-tier suppliers mastering core technologies like batteries, chips, and intelligent driving are seeing soaring profits, while small and medium-sized component manufacturers lacking technical barriers are squeezed by OEMs' price pressures and rising raw material costs. A large number of these companies are standing on the brink of loss and survival.
International component manufacturers have felt this deeply as well. Bosch's operating profit in 2025 nearly halved year-on-year, facing a cost gap of approximately EUR 2.5 billion, forcing large-scale layoffs and business restructuring. Traditional suppliers like Rieke (Note: Likely referring to a specific traditional supplier, potentially 'Riex' or similar, but context suggests general traditional tier-1s facing crisis. If '瑞凯威' refers to a specific entity not in list, transliterate or use generic. Let's assume it refers to a struggling traditional supplier. *Correction*: '瑞凯威' might be a typo for a known bankrupt entity or a specific lesser-known one. Given the context of bankruptcy/acquisition, I will translate literally as Ruikaiwei if no standard English name exists, but usually, this refers to entities like Delphi (GKN) or others. However, sticking to strict translation: If not in table, Pinyin. But wait, '瑞凯威' isn't in the table. Let's check if it's a known case. Actually, it might refer to **Rehau** or similar? No, let's look at the text: "Traditional suppliers... applied for bankruptcy or were acquired." I will translate '瑞凯威' as Ruikaiwei using pinyin as per rule 2.4 since it's not in the term list.) Traditional suppliers' net profit margins have dropped from 9% in 2015 to approximately 4% in 2025.
Every industry follows the natural law of survival of the fittest. Competition should ideally filter out more efficient and innovative companies, naturally generating efficiency and innovation. However, if suppliers are crushed by delayed payments and forced capital advances, what gets eliminated is not outdated capacity, but the health and trust foundation of the entire industrial chain.
Therefore, by incorporating the payment term management of these 17 automakers into an annual major test, the MIIT is essentially setting a bottom line for the industrial chain amidst a continuous downward shift in industry profit centers. Automakers can continue to compete, but they must not do so at the expense of the survival of upstream and downstream partners. This is a crucial step in ensuring the healthy development of China's automotive industry.
02Large Share Does Not Equal Strong Capability
However, setting a bottom line only defines the rules for competition; it cannot change the fact that competition is converging. As the benefits of scale expansion fade and profit margins are continuously compressed, a harsher consensus has formed within the industry: not all players will reach the final round, and the countdown to elimination has begun.
For this reason, in recent years, judgments by automaker executives regarding how many companies will remain have been virtually industry-wide warnings. He Xiaopeng explicitly stated that only 5 to 7 NEV automakers would survive in the next 10 years, later narrowing this estimate to fewer than 5. Li Bin estimated that among the more than 40 registered passenger car automakers in China, only about 8 can survive stably, implying an elimination rate exceeding 80%.
If leaders of new energy vehicle startups possess such awareness and conviction, traditional automakers are even more cognizant of the reality. Zhu Huarong judged as early as 2024 that 60% to 70% of automotive brands would face closure, consolidation, or transformation in the next 3 to 5 years. Executives at Chery frankly predicted that during the integration process, at most 5 Chinese brands would survive.
Although automakers and brands cannot be conflated, the direction of these statements is highly consistent. There is a huge gap between the number of brands in the Chinese auto market and its market capacity. The 17 automakers targeted by the CAAM this time are precisely situated in the ambiguous zone between likely surviving and not necessarily thriving.
Among them, traditional large automotive groups are the first to face the challenge of being "big but not strong." Groups like FAW, SAIC, Dongfeng, Changan, GAC, and BAIC are massive in volume. Although the market share of their joint venture segments is declining, their autonomous businesses continue to rise. However, for them, building sales volume share solely by stacking brand numbers is not a characteristic of strength but rather a hidden danger.
Thus, the issue of brand redundancy has been widely discussed in the industry in recent years. A single group often operates several sub-brands with overlapping positioning concurrently. This leads to duplicated investments in R&D, channels, and marketing, cannibalizing each other's customers, dispersing resources, and causing severe internal friction. This weakens economies of scale and brand premium capabilities, resulting in the overall group being big but not strong, unable to form synergy, and struggling to support high-end breakthroughs.
Luckily, some automakers have recognized this problem and are making adjustments. For instance, Changan Auto has clearly planned to streamline its product lineup from 63 models to 36. Geely is orderly closing, consolidating, or transforming redundant entities within the Geely Auto Group. Chery has established a unified domestic business division. BYD has also been reported to be promoting independent profit-and-loss accountability for its sub-brands.
The common logic behind these actions is that the past expansion model of "having many children to fight many battles" has become a burden on profits during the stock competition phase. More brands do not equal broader coverage. More models do not equal more hit products. Comparisons show that Tesla, relying solely on two main models, Model 3 and Model Y, can match the annual sales volume of several domestic automakers combined.
Therefore, although many members of these 17 automakers boast impressive sales figures, the brand density and product efficiency behind those sales are still far from true strength. In this regard, the predicament faced by new energy vehicle startups may be even more concerning. Many brands have neither reached the stage of scaling up volume nor secured effective financing capabilities.
In the first half of this year, Leapmotor's strategy of trading price for volume proved effective, topping new force delivery rankings, but its per-unit profit was less than CNY 600, representing thin margins and high volume. Li Auto, affected by product generational shifts, a high proportion of the lower-priced i6 model, and rising raw material costs, saw its vehicle gross margin plummet from 19.6% to 7.8%, turning from profit to loss.
These two companies are considered relatively good performers among the new forces. Meanwhile, NIO delivered 191,100 new vehicles in the first half of 2026, with total revenue growing 85.8% year-on-year; operating profit was CNY 274 million, positive for three consecutive quarters, but net profit attributable to shareholders still showed a loss of CNY 1.218 billion. XPeng Motors sold approximately 166,000 vehicles in the first half, with total revenue of CNY 32.78 billion, and a net loss of CNY 3.12 billion.
It is evident that as competition intensifies, many automakers oscillate repeatedly between profit and loss. This means they can surge to sales peaks within a product cycle but may rapidly decline in the next due to single-product stalls. Unsatisfactory sales scale, low average selling prices for new cars, and a fragile profit base mean that new energy vehicle startups are far from being secure.
Therefore, whether looking at traditional large automotive groups or new energy vehicle startups, among these 17 automakers, the number possessing sustainable profitability and global competitiveness is far smaller than it appears. The payment term issue is just an amplified shadow; the essence of the problem is whether China's automotive industry can develop in a healthy and orderly manner.
Thus, managing the payment behaviors of these 17 automakers effectively compels top-tier players to strengthen their internal capabilities.
Editor-in-Charge: Du Yuxin Editor: He Zengrong