Whether referring to reports from the CCID Think Tank under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) or firsthand experiences shared by industry practitioners, one undeniable fact emerges: the development of the low-altitude economy has slowed down over the past year, particularly following a major public safety incident at the end of June.
Recently, many friends have asked for my views on the new normal of the low-altitude economy over the past four months. My stance is clear: only by ensuring effective prevention can we enable future flight operations. Recently, many governments have elevated the priority of building low-altitude defense infrastructure, and the Ministry of Public Security has established a Drone Safety and Defense Bureau. This is akin to installing traffic lights and median barriers on newly paved roads—sharpening the axe does not delay the woodcutting. Nationwide, we believe that the recent increase in difficulty regarding airspace applications and the decline in capital activity due to reduced confidence are merely temporary challenges.
Discussions with numerous experts and officials from aviation authorities reveal a consensus: regulators have adopted a more cautious attitude toward airworthiness certification. Consequently, the certification timelines previously estimated by many eVTOL and drone companies will likely be extended.
Regarding this point, our recent thinking is as follows: The slowdown in the low-altitude economy has created valuable opportunities for the development of the upstream supply chain.
Since China started later than Western countries in R&D for civil airliners and general aviation aircraft, there remains a significant gap between domestic capabilities and those of Europe and the US in key subsystems such as flight control, avionics, and propulsion systems. This disparity is particularly evident when comparing the domestic eVTOL upstream supply chain with the self-developed subsystems or upstream supply chains of Joby and Archer.
Taking eVTOL motor products as an example, suppliers across China—including research institutes affiliated with AVIC (Aviation Industry Corporation of China) and emerging private enterprises—lag behind Joby’s motors in terms of performance and power-to-weight ratio. Joby’s motors feature a high power-to-weight ratio (low mass), combined with low rotational speed and high torque (peak torque of 1800 N·m, continuous torque of 1380 N·m; rotational speed is approximately 800 r/min during hovering and about 250 r/min during cruise). This characteristic allows for greater weight reduction opportunities for their propellers (the higher the rotational speed, the greater the loads the propeller must withstand, leading to higher strength requirements and typically increased structural weight).
One cannot make bricks without straw. Even outstanding OEMs can only select components from domestic specialist suppliers—including motors and propellers—that represent "local optima" within the domestic market. As a result, empty weight exceedances are common in complete aircraft, and actual payload capacity and endurance often fall short of nominal specifications. Industry insiders are well aware of this reality, yet everyone tacitly agrees not to mention it publicly.
The upstream supply chain for complete aircraft, particularly critical subsystems like propulsion, flight control, and avionics, requires adherence to objective engineering principles and long-term accumulation. It cannot be achieved overnight through massive capital inflows or ad-hoc assembly of R&D personnel.
To illustrate further: I once communicated with the Chief Safety Engineer for the Boeing 787 flight control computer at Honeywell. The Excel spreadsheet detailing the Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) for the flight control computer alone spans 80 pages when printed on A4 paper. Years of engineer analysis, combined with historical data and failure experience from multiple previous Boeing aircraft models, formed this substantial organizational asset at Honeywell. These valuable data assets constitute the primary competitive moat for avionics giants like Honeywell and Thales.
In the fields of civil airliners, general aviation aircraft, and even civilian helicopters, China owes too much compared to the West. In my view, the core of the low-altitude economy lies first in having more reliable aircraft, which largely depends on an excellent upstream supply chain. The current slowdown in the low-altitude economy provides a rare breathing space and room for growth for the upstream supply chain. Suppliers can now tackle technical challenges with less time pressure, contributing higher-quality "internal organs"—key subsystems and components—to complete aircraft. Only then can continuous optimization in performance improvement, weight reduction, and cost lowering become possible, thereby solidifying the foundation for the low-altitude economy's development.
Reference: 2025 Low-Altitude Economy Development Falls Short of Expectations