Author: Xu Shanshan, Editor: Li Motian
The just-concluded Q3 earnings season could be described as a "misery contest" for German automakers.
In the third quarter, Volkswagen reported revenue of CNY 75.277 billion (note: original text says Euro, context implies currency check needed, but source says '亿欧元' which is Hundred Million Euros. Let's stick to Euros as per standard financial reporting unless specified otherwise. The prompt says: "If no currency is marked, default to CNY; if explicitly stated as USD/JPY etc., keep it." Here it says "欧元" (Euro). So I will use EUR.) Wait, re-reading constraint 3.2: "Amount rule: If the original text does not mark the currency... default to CNY... If the original text explicitly states USD / JPY etc., retain the original currency." The text says "亿欧元" (100 million Euros). So I must use EUR.
Correction on Currency Handling: The input text uses "欧元" (Euro). Therefore, I will translate amounts as EUR.
Volkswagen's Q3 revenue was EUR 75.277 billion, with an operating loss of EUR 5.86 billion, marking its largest single-quarter loss in the past decade. For the first three quarters, revenue reached EUR 233.378 billion, with sales of 6 million vehicles and profit of EUR 0.071 billion.
Focusing solely on the automotive business, revenue for the first three quarters dipped slightly from EUR 213.132 billion in the same period last year to EUR 205.617 billion. However, operating profit swung from EUR 2.216 billion to negative EUR 1.972 billion.
The issues were primarily due to one-time expenses: software company CARIAD and the battery business accounted for EUR 2.3 billion in provisions, Porsche suffered a goodwill impairment of EUR 6.4 billion, and asset write-downs at Chinese joint ventures added another EUR 1 billion. Excluding these losses, the financial performance was not as dire.
Revenue and profit figures for each brand in the table do not account for intercompany eliminations.
As the face of high-end German manufacturing, BBA (BMW, Benz, Audi) faced significant pressure.
Audi's financial report includes four brands: Audi, Bentley, Lamborghini, and Ducati, collectively known as Volkswagen's "Progressive" brand group.
However, the Progressive brand group's performance in the third quarter was far from progressive. Revenue fell 18.5% year-on-year to EUR 12.886 billion, while operating profit plummeted 93.9% year-on-year to EUR 0.029 billion.
Audi contributed over 90% of the sales volume but only 40% of the profits, indicating that profitability relied heavily on the high-margin Lamborghini.
BMW's situation was also less than optimistic. In the third quarter, revenue was EUR 30.452 billion, with EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) at EUR 1.589 billion. For the first three quarters, revenue and EBIT were EUR 92.718 billion and EUR 5.224 billion respectively, representing year-on-year declines of 7.3% and 35.2%.
According to BMW's official metrics, excluding the impact of US tariffs, depreciation and amortization arising from the acquisition of the remaining stake in Brilliance BMW reduced margins by 1.2%. However, even without this cost, automotive business profits had already fallen by a quarter.
Revenue and profit figures for each business segment in the table do not account for intercompany transaction eliminations.
Next door, Mercedes-Benz's passenger car business generated EUR 22.374 billion in revenue in the third quarter, with adjusted EBIT of EUR 5.6 billion—a direct halving. For the first three quarters, revenue was EUR 68.319 billion, and adjusted EBIT declined 40% year-on-year.
Mercedes-Benz did not have one-time expenses; the primary factor was poor vehicle sales. Free cash flow dropped sharply by 87% in the third quarter, partly because inventory buildup tied up EUR 2.06 billion in cash.
Mercedes-Benz management explained this as proactive stocking to boost volume in the fourth quarter. Whether these produced vehicles can be sold remains to be seen until the Q4 earnings report.
Revenue and profit figures for each business segment in the table do not account for intercompany transaction eliminations.
Where did the problems lie?
The Biggest Variable
The problem lies in the Chinese market.
In the third quarter, Mercedes-Benz's global vehicle sales fell 6.4% year-on-year, with total sales for the first three quarters dropping from 1.6016 million to 1.5031 million units. BMW delivered 551,000 units in the third quarter, a decline of 6.3%, and saw a 4.9% drop to 1.7078 million units for the first three quarters.
However, if the China/Asia-Pacific markets are excluded, Mercedes-Benz's sales for the first three quarters rose 3% year-on-year. BMW's sales rose 1.28% year-on-year.
For Volkswagen, even after excluding the Chinese market, sales still declined, but the situation improved significantly.
For the first three quarters, Volkswagen's global sales fell 9.3%. After excluding the China/Asia-Pacific markets, sales declined by only 0.03%, which is virtually negligible.
Including the China/Asia-Pacific markets, the Progressive brand group where Audi resides saw sales fall 11.3% for the first three quarters. Excluding China, the decline narrowed to 3.7%.
In other words, global sales for all German automakers were dragged down by the Chinese market without exception. The cause of this situation is found in the sales structure.
New energy vehicle retail penetration in China has exceeded 67%, with pure electric vehicles accounting for nearly 70%. Yet, in this world's largest new energy market, German automakers are still selling mostly internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles.
Mercedes-Benz and BMW's share of new energy vehicle sales stands at around 25%. In the third quarter, global pure electric vehicle sales grew across the board, except for a dismal performance in China.
According to Yiche data, Mercedes-Benz sold fewer than 10,000 new energy vehicles domestically in the first three quarters. Conversely, the GLC and E-Class models remained strong sellers, exceeding 160,000 units. BMW's ICE-to-EV converted product, the i3, barely broke 1,000 units in average monthly sales—only one-tenth of the fuel-powered 3 Series.
Volkswagen is even more typical. It sold many new energy vehicles, but mostly to its European and American counterparts.
Taking pure electric vehicles as an example, Volkswagen delivered 18,000 units in China in the third quarter, a year-on-year decrease of 30.1%. Deliveries for the first three quarters totaled 48,900 units, down 42.5% year-on-year. In China, only one out of every 40 Volkswagens delivered is purely electric, whereas in Europe, one out of every five is purely electric.
Pure electric vehicles aren't selling, and the ICE market is collapsing rapidly. This dual squeeze has pushed German automakers to the brink of crisis.
For the first three quarters, Mercedes-Benz's sales in China dropped from 433,900 to 300,000 units, a reduction by half compared to the same period in 2021. BMW's sales in China for the first three quarters were 376,400 units, nearly half less than the 670,000 units sold in the same period of 2021.
Volkswagen's decline was even more severe. Sales in China fell 38.7% year-on-year in the third quarter, and total sales for the first three quarters dropped from 1.9731 million to 1.3752 million units. The 600,000 units that vanished could sustain an entire new startup.
It's not that the Germans didn't try hard enough; it's simply that the next generation of pure electric vehicles arrived too late.
Waiting for Pure Electrics Until White-haired
While pure electric models surged in the Chinese market, the German powers happened to be in the gap between pure electric product generations.
Mercedes-Benz is the most typical case. In 2019, Mercedes-Benz hastily tested the waters with the EQC, an ICE-to-EV conversion. They then aimed to turn things around with the pure electric platform EVA, but the debut model, the EQS, stagnated upon launch.
With native pure electric models EQS and EQE failing consecutively, Mercedes-Benz clearly suffered a setback. They slashed the next-generation pure electric platform MB.EA-Large and instead continued to patch up the EVA. As the EQ series gradually exited the stage, two new platforms from Mercedes-Benz finally arrived late:
The MMA platform for compact cars and the MB.EA-M pure electric platform for mid-size vehicles.
This means that from 2019 to 2022, after concentrating the release of the EQ series, Mercedes-Benz launched no new pure electric products. Last year, when the new generation of pure electric vehicles hit the market, large-scale model deployment had just begun, missing the wave of rising pure electric penetration rates.
Audi's situation is similar. In 2018, Audi unveiled the e-tron, an ICE-to-EV conversion, and simultaneously announced the co-development of the PPE pure electric platform with Porsche. The first model was originally planned for release in 2022, but R&D progress was repeatedly delayed.
Consequently, Audi used Porsche's J1 platform to build the e-tron GT and Volkswagen's MEB platform to create the Q4/Q5 e-tron. Throughout 2023, they could only make minor adjustments to these two models.
It wasn't until last year that the PPE platform entered mass production, alongside the ADP platform specifically developed for the Chinese market.
This indicates that Audi's true generational shift in pure electric models also spanned nearly three years. The old e-tron series failed to gain traction, and the new generation of pure electrics has just taken over, serving primarily to fill gaps in the product line.
Volkswagen is slightly different. At the end of 2019, Volkswagen pioneered the MEB pure electric platform. The initial ID.3 sold reasonably well, followed by the successive launches of the ID.4, ID.5, and ID.6. However, after the ID.7 was released in 2023, Volkswagen's pace of pure electric model launches slowed, entering a two-year gap.
Volkswagen faces more practical issues: while it has pure electric platforms, its electronic/electrical architecture is inherently deficient, resulting in clear competitive disadvantages in China. Internal development at CARIAD has been troubled, pushing the realization timeline of the ultimate SSP platform back to 2029.
To fill this void, Volkswagen took two steps: first, having the Chinese team lead the development of the new CMP platform; second, abandoning the original electronic/electrical architecture in favor of the CEA architecture co-developed with XPeng. This resulted in the new platform's implementation lagging behind those of Mercedes-Benz and Audi.
Compared to Volkswagen, which started early but finished late, BMW was arguably the most conservative and stubborn.
Starting with the locally produced iX3 in 2020, BMW's pure electric vehicles in China were uniformly based on the CLAR platform—essentially ICE-to-EV conversions, sticking to one path to the end.
As demand for pure electric vehicles grew increasingly robust, patching things up became unsustainable. BMW's Neue Klasse pure electric vehicles finally emerged. Overseas versions went on sale in August, but deliveries in the Chinese market won't begin until at least the first quarter of next year.
At the critical juncture of model transitions, German automakers face similar awkwardness:
Old platform pure electric vehicles are being discontinued, while new platform pure electric vehicles have just been released and haven't yet scaled. During the year of rapid pure electric penetration in the Chinese market, they missed the timing perfectly.
Late product arrival is a cyclical issue; once new models start deploying, performance should naturally improve. However, if massive investments in new models still fail to compete against local startups, it becomes a structural problem.