(This article is the first chapter of a series based on a half-month on-site survey of US factories conducted in October.)
Whether Chinese enterprises can invest in factories in the United States is a difficult choice at present.
After the US midterm elections, the Democratic Party, which is more skilled at designing precise policies, took power. This seems to be unfavorable news for Chinese manufacturing. However, the excessive arbitrariness of the US President has also created many uncertainties, making it difficult for enterprises to make decisions. Yet people still need to tolerate this uncertainty. In this election, although the Republican Party lost its majority in both chambers of Congress, the President still maintains strong policy maneuverability.
In any case, neither of the two major US parties will be overly friendly toward Chinese enterprises. Therefore, rather than constantly watching immediate tactical adjustments brought about by these policy changes, Chinese enterprises should prepare for a long-term battle. If the US is an important strategic market, then for Chinese enterprises, going to the US later may not be as good as going earlier.
Motivations for Landing and Three Sharp Confrontations
Since the tariff war began in 2018, people have increasingly realized that raising tariffs and slogans like "Buy American" cannot bring manufacturing entirely back to the US. However, the fact that US manufacturing cannot fully recover does not mean Chinese enterprises can continue to stay domestically and hold onto global market share. Outside of the US and China, third countries are becoming the main battlefield for China's supply chain. And their ultimate destination is often still the US. Large-scale reshoring of US manufacturing is unlikely. But small-scale recovery is entirely possible. The US is the source of global geopolitical risks, but it is not inherently a dangerous place itself. Direct investment and factory construction in the US still hide great opportunities.
The situations seen by entrepreneurs are not the same. Fuyao Glass can treat the US as a large pond of profits, while Jiangnan Mould & Plastic had to transfer its South Carolina factory to another enterprise for one dollar in the end. In such a diverse country as the US, people cannot use a simple rule to judge whether the US is worth landing a Chinese factory. Everyone's perception is completely different. It depends on which state the evaluator is in, which industry they are engaged in, and what kind of employees they encounter.
The motivations for Chinese factories landing in the US include both negative and positive factors. There are two negative factors: high tariffs and mandatory requirements from chain leaders. The requirements of chain leaders often have a more precise directional pull on enterprises. General Motors already has a clear timeline, requiring its Chinese supply chain to complete "China +1" by the end of 2027. The pressure from GM forced the automotive supply chain to first move out of China, then require landing in North America, and even directly set up factories in the US. Such tough demands from chain leaders are hard for suppliers to refuse.
However, there are also positive factors that lead enterprises to proactively seek to land, such as the temptation of the market. Some enterprises realize that setting up factories in the US offers a large enough market and high enough profits. With proper management, Chinese enterprises can defeat European or local enterprises established there. Another implied meaning is escaping the fierce domestic competition with peers. For most enterprises, setting up factories in the US naturally evokes fear. Establishing factories overseas is, from a certain perspective, like a shark net on the coast—not all surfers can cross it. In a few areas, national subsidies in the US, such as in photovoltaics and batteries, are also reasons for enterprises to go build factories.
There are three most intense industrial confrontations between China and the US, presenting the most extreme boundaries. First is the insulated world of semiconductor chips. China has significantly increased its chip manufacturing share over the past four years, accounting for more than 23% globally. But it is basically concentrated in mature processes, while US manufacturing is currently 13%, but everything being built is advanced process nodes, and it is expected to rise to 20% in three years. The trajectories of Chinese chips and US chips are completely diverging. The two sides may present a significant generational gap in process nodes.
Second is the inability to act in the automotive sector. Out of genuine fear of Chinese automobiles, the US is single-mindedly keeping Chinese OEMs outside the gate. Because there are alternative solutions from South Korea in the electric vehicle field, the US dependence on China does not seem so strong. However, compared to the struggles of complete vehicles, Chinese auto parts have walked a path full of potential.
Photovoltaics lie between the two extremes of chips and cars. The US industry presents complex emotions of strong need and strong vigilance. The demand for PV development in the US remains strong; in the first half of 2026, 46% of installed power capacity came from PV. This ratio once reached as high as 64% in 2024. Moreover, US subsidies for the PV industry will not terminate until 2032. In the interim, huge opportunities still exist. The US PV leader First Solar uses thin-film technology, with photoelectric conversion efficiency lagging behind China by three generations. These enterprises, considered "backward capacity" in China, can still reap abundant profits. In 2025, First Solar alone earned CNY 10 billion in profit. Meanwhile, the top four giant PV companies in China each suffered losses exceeding CNY 5 billion.
The stunning aspect of the PV field is that it demonstrates a characteristic of US manufacturing: backward technology can still make money. Many phenomena in US manufacturing often jump beyond common sense.
Within the boundaries defined by these three industries, multiple possibilities exist. Much of US manufacturing is unexpectedly strong, and utility poles are one example.
US Utility Poles Have Global Advantages
Utility poles look commonplace, but they are a high-quality benchmark reflecting manufacturing capability. In new-generation fiberglass pultruded utility poles, the US has demonstrated global advantages.
In Texas, Utah, and other places, composite material high-voltage transmission poles are everywhere, standing like pillars between heaven and earth, leaving a deep impression. GFRP (Glass Fiber Reinforced Polymer) pultruded poles can be used as large composite poles resistant to wildfires and hurricanes, but true application in vast regions requires long-term service data and standard systems. Although wooden utility poles are still numerous in the US, new-generation poles are accelerating replacement, backed entirely by US local manufacturers such as CCG and Strongwell. In using fiberglass for reinforced large utility poles, China is still catching up. Domestic small-specification GFRP distribution poles (10kV) from companies like Wuhan NARI and Jiangsu Far East have been supplied in batches, but there is still a huge gap in technical depth compared to US enterprises.
The manufacturing capability of utility poles reflects the capability of upstream fiberglass materials. Fiberglass has wide applications. Rooms in homes are filled with fiberglass: from drywall to wall mesh cloth, and battery switch boxes.
The two most complete global fiberglass industries are one in China and one in the US. The application scope of the US supply chain is even more enduring. Many fiberglass application processes were invented by Americans. For example, replacing rebar with fiberglass has been popularized in the US for many years. Currently, Owens Corning in the US and NEG (Nippon Electric Glass) in Japan dominate high-end drawing technology. Meanwhile, China Jushi has also invested heavily in South Carolina, establishing a foothold.
Upstream of fiberglass is high-purity quartz sand. The US does not lack this either. In fact, the US has a strong advantage. During the crystal pulling process, the inner layer transparent sand of the fused silica crucible contacting silicon liquid has long relied heavily on US mineral belts. The high-purity quartz mine in Spruce Pine, North Carolina, USA, possesses rock ore with the lowest alkali metal impurities. Belgium's Sibelco (which acquired Unimin) and Norway's TQC mine and process here, achieving quartz purity up to 4N8 (99.998%). Chinese PV enterprises cannot yet leave the supply of these two companies.
Quartz sand can be made into crucibles or fiberglass. Fiberglass can be made into utility poles or wind turbines. Fiberglass fabric merchants like Germany's Saertex have set up factories in the US, turning fiberglass and resin into composite fabrics sold to wind turbine blade makers like US-based TPI or LM (acquired by GE Vernova). Ultimately, these blades are provided to Siemens Gamesa, GE Energy, or China's Goldwind Technology.
Seeing this line clearly reveals the real ambition of the US in the wind power industry. Starting from quartz sand from US mines, to fiberglass drawing factories, to fiberglass fabrics, to US local blade factories, all the way to wind turbine manufacturers. Every link calculates local content, and finally, the government provides tax credits under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). Like utility poles, the goal of the North American wind power industry promoted by the US is to achieve full-chain localization.
US Manufacturing Hollowed Out, But Not Empty
The variety of US domestic manufacturing remains complete; even items like pillows, sofas, and candles have sporadic manufacturing. The breadth of US manufacturing exhibits the characteristic of "small but unyielding." These scattered SMEs do not have strong manufacturing capabilities, but they represent market needs. From a certain perspective, these factories dotted like mountain flowers also represent opportunities for Chinese manufacturing.
This type of industry can be defined as the US essential goods industry. Examples include daily necessities like pillows and cotton yarn, or ordinary machine parts. These are the industries least related to geopolitics, yet they are often frequent targets of the tariff big stick. A country's tariff thorns point outward, targeting imports. By entering the US hinterland to establish factories, Chinese enterprises can permanently solve the harm of tariffs. These industries leave little market depth, often accommodating only one or two enterprises. Their existence often takes the form of hidden champions. In South Carolina, USA, there is such a sample of the most authentic Chinese hidden champion. This time, it comes from Yuncheng, Shanxi.
Engraving rollers for intaglio printing involves carving various patterns onto copper-plated stainless steel rollers. These copper roller plates are widely used in intaglio printing machines for food packaging, daily chemicals, and tobacco packaging. As an industry leader, Shanxi Yuncheng Printing Plate achieved over 70% domestic market share in China by 2007, with clients including Yili and Want Want. Its ways to expand scale are either diversification or globalization.
Many Chinese specialized, refined, differential, and innovative enterprises adopt the first route, gaining growth opportunities through diversification. Many listed companies are particularly like this. Pressured by performance, these companies turn to business diversification after listing. In the Chinese environment, the end of specialization is often diversification, not hidden champions.
True hidden champions can only globalize. After reaching number one in domestic market share, Shanxi Yuncheng Printing Plate immediately began replicating factories globally. Starting from 2000, it successively opened factories in Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, and other places, and went to production in the US in 2009. Now, it has 100 factories domestically, and nearly 40 overseas factories distributed across 22 countries. In Vietnam alone, there are 3 factories. However, one company going out does not mean an entire industry can go out. Kaiteng Precision, ranked second in the domestic intaglio printing plate roller industry, has annual revenue of around CNY 500 million. But overseas, it basically has no bases. Shanxi Yuncheng Printing Plate is the most internationally pioneering Chinese company laying eggs along the journey. Its intaglio copper roller factory in South Carolina is a very quiet mini-factory. It proves that the form of small factories can still thrive comfortably in the US market.
From a technical perspective, intaglio printing actually accounts for less than 10% of the market and is yielding to flexible relief printing. Even overall, the printing plate-making industry itself is a sunset industry, continuously shrinking. But even so, Yuncheng Printing Plate still has its own way of survival. The US is a lucrative market. The price of Chinese intaglio printing is only CNY 0.08 per square centimeter, while in the US it is worth CNY 1. The price difference is more than 12 times. Moreover, delivery here is easier to follow step-by-step. In recent years, Chinese printing patterns, to prevent product designs from being stolen, were often released in large batches at once once finalized. In the US, however, printing volumes are often added gradually. Therefore, the time requirements for order quantities are not so tight regarding delivery.
The standard lead time is 7 days. Less than 5 days requires a 25% surcharge. Domestically, shipment is required within 2 days or even 1 day. Mistakes due to rush work are common. Both sides are tense; if the plate sent over cannot be used, it must be returned for repair. The costs incurred often fall on the plate maker, further compressing profits.
The refined operation of Chinese factories also allows Yuncheng Printing Plate's US subsidiary to draw on the cost control experience of the headquarters' production process. Through long-term persistence, the US plate roller capacity of German old giants like WETZEL has gradually shrunk, exiting the track one after another. The original markets of those players were handed over to this Shanxi company.
In the US, only Southern Graphics Systems (SGS), a pre-press printing service company, remains among plate makers. Due to anti-counterfeiting and fine line requirements, the tobacco packaging industry generally uses intaglio printing, and Marlboro is SGS's largest client.
However, as long as it adheres to a ten-year operational philosophy, this Shanxi company also has the opportunity to win orders from Marlboro in the US. Therefore, even though the paper products and packaging market appears to be shrinking, when competitors disappear from the track one by one, the remaining space is consumed by this Shanxi company. This is the characteristic of Chinese enterprises: they have sufficient tolerance for low profits and often endure until the opponent exits.
The biggest test in this is the agony of patience and cost control. Hangzhou Colortone, which makes pure cotton spinning, has been deployed in South Carolina, USA, for ten years. While gradually gaining trust from downstream users, it has also worn down competitors one by one. But even so, profits must be squeezed out like wringing a towel from costs. This is a very real form of Chinese companies coming to the US: relying on team resilience and cost awareness.
Many manufacturing profits are meager, inherently unsuitable for the high operating costs of US manufacturing. Chinese enterprises often have stronger endurance for micro-profits than their US counterparts. For business soil like saline-alkaline land, Chinese factories are actually more likely to grit their teeth and persist. Production in US factories is not easy for Chinese factories, but nor is it easy for Americans to manage production.
Mlily Home Furnishing has factories in both South Carolina and Arizona. Although the South Carolina factory suffered heavy damage from a fire, its Arizona factory maintained good operating conditions. In comparison, Mlily's US peers were not so lucky.
North Carolina furniture merchant TOV has an annual revenue of USD 100 million. It established sofa factories in Vietnam and North Carolina in 2024 and 2025 respectively. The Vietnam factory was migrated by Chinese suppliers, while the North Carolina factory was managed independently. High Point, NC, once claimed to be the "World Furniture Capital," but reopening factories faced numerous difficulties. The labor and raw material cost of a sofa manufactured in Vietnam is USD 280, totaling USD 448 after shipping to the US, whereas manufacturing it in North Carolina costs USD 2,700. However, TOV's sofa retail price can only be USD 1,500. Manufacturing swallowed most of the cost, making this factory unsustainable. The US boss clearly lacked on-site management experience, and the devilish details along the production line exhausted his energy. Ten months after opening, this factory quickly closed. Supply mainly returned to Vietnam, with 70% of sources relying on factories migrated from China.
Compared to the day-and-night battles of Silicon Valley large model companies, the rhythm of traditional US manufacturing is unhurried. US factories have gone bankrupt one after another, while Chinese factories show greater adaptability. Among the trees growing slowly in forgotten time, Chinese factories extend their roots bit by bit in all directions. If this situation continues to evolve, many industries will see Chinese factories becoming the last sole survivors on US soil. Conversely, US factories themselves may need to continue moving overseas.
External Armor and Internal Robe
How do Chinese factories survive in the US? The answer is: wear American armor and build an American social interface. The factory is the robe left inside the armor. This means the manufacturing link will organically integrate with other value chains.
The mindset of pure export is increasingly difficult to advance. The fluctuation of US import tariffs poses a huge challenge to equipment exported by China. In 2025, due to sudden tariff hikes, an engineering machinery manufacturer had to gradually stop importing equipment, otherwise selling more meant losing more. However, when the enterprise stopped importing, tariffs suddenly eased. In the first half of 2026, combined with vigorous user demand, the enterprise was overwhelmed and unable to complete deliveries. One important obstacle was shipping disrupted by various risks. China's massive NEV exports also squeezed shipping space for engineering machinery. High fees and uncertain schedules turned exports into a nightmare.
In between, there are troubles formed by supply chain adaptation. Different markets have completely different requirements for components. If going to Western markets, for example, for engineering machinery axles, it is best to choose Germany's Kessler or US Dana. In other countries, domestic brands might be chosen. Uncertainty in orders disrupts the rhythm of upstream component procurement, further increasing the difficulty of organizing production.
However, establishing factories locally in the US can overcome these unexpected difficulties. This also leads global trade to pursue an expensive immunity effect: local factory construction. When tariffs appear like surprise attacks repeatedly, it causes frequent supply chain shifts. Bringing factories closest to the market is the most important step in industrial movement.
Therefore, for Chinese enterprises to take root in the US market, having only a sales company is insufficient; the presence of a factory is crucial. However, "American Factory" also needs a new definition, differing from domestic perceptions.
In the early stages of business, factories often present a combination of virtual and real states. A Chinese enterprise's factory in the southern US has nearly 200 people, but the actual manufacturing part has fewer than 20. In reality, equipment assembly here is not the focus. If calculating purely for production assembly, only a few units can be assembled per day. Looking solely at production, profitability is absolutely impossible; there is no scale, and efficiency is low. However, the factory is a companion balancer for overall sales and service. Its capacity adjusts according to tariff fluctuations. When tariffs on whole-machine imports are high, some components can be imported from around the world for final assembly here. This method can alleviate some urgent orders.
Such a capacity-floating factory needs a key social interface. True American manufacturing must match US market positioning and US high-premium sales. If the enterprise can don American armor (such as having Americans as sales staff, customer service, and CEO), although costs will rise significantly, prices will also increase substantially.
Therefore, the most important thing for Chinese enterprises in the US is "localization of the customer interface." Sales, service, and product managers must all be locals; achieving this allows for selling at good prices. If local production, spare parts service, or R&D can be further provided, higher premiums are achievable.
The US factory has become a "value complex." After-sales service and spare parts warehousing are all placed inside, while pure manufacturing is only a small part. In this case, this composite factory can be profitable.
The connotation of "American Factory" has significant adjustment space for Chinese enterprises. It still has a huge supply chain and manufacturing tail trailing overseas. The capacity of the US factory is not determined solely by the US market. It is closely related to US tariffs, local manufacturing costs, and costs of other production bases. Any change in tariffs creates a tight interaction with distant Indonesian factories and Chinese factories.
Having the physical entity of a factory allows seizing the initiative to lengthen the value chain. A Chinese brake hose enterprise in Ohio became a main supplier for GM and Ford. However, the pricing system for these traditional rubber-aluminum products has been calculated clearly by OEMs. Relying solely on OEM suppliers often means mere survival without good profits. The real profit source for this enterprise comes from independent aftermarket auto parts chain retailers like AutoZone, Advance Auto Parts, and O'Reilly. To serve these retail giants, the factory needs large local warehouses and independent transportation and distribution departments. The commercial model for auto parts has been redefined into a two-part combination of "OEM + Aftermarket Retail." The latter implies good logistics services. Therefore, at the other end of this factory's production line, there is a voluminous warehouse, with various trucks shuttling outside.
This is the meaning of the American factory. It establishes different business operating systems around different commercial models and profit sources. The American factory embeds into complex business forms in different puzzle-piece ways.
"American Factory" Is Daily Trivial Risks
In Ohio, there is the most successful US factory for Chinese enterprises going global: Fuyao Glass. It successfully kept unions out and gained fame in China through the Oscar-winning documentary "American Factory" produced by Participant Media. For Chinese enterprises, the most enlightening aspect is: after the factory lands, the iconic US risks shift internally. Political risks often sweep away like a gust of wind, while cultural conflicts occur almost every day on the shop floor.
Fuyao Glass's Dayton plant in Ohio was originally a light truck manufacturing plant closed by GM in 2008. A director couple nearby, moved by the scene, filmed "The Last Truck," describing the Rust Belt moment formed by the gradual relocation of the US auto manufacturing industry. When Fuyao Glass bought this land in 2014 and rebuilt the glass factory, it brought hopes of employment recovery to the area. As Chinese workers cleared the grass with lawnmowers, the director couple felt future vitality from the scent of cut grass. They hoped to film a documentary titled "First Glass," recording the moment from factory construction to the first sheet of glass rolling off the line. On the same land, Chinese capital pulled unemployed Rust Belt workers back to the production line, undoubtedly a story of hope seeds and community revival. The directors' independent filming plan received full cooperation from Fuyao. All work and meeting scenes were open to the filming crew. Not only the Ohio factory, but also the subsequent float glass factory in Illinois and the small glass factory in Detroit, Michigan, entered the camera's focus.
However, the beautiful overture flashed by. Differences in Chinese and American management concepts choked workers' throats with smoking anger. American workers remembered the high welfare benefits of the GM era vividly, while Chinese management brought efficient production discipline. Employees on both sides did not understand each other, and unions tried to seize the opportunity to organize employee votes to establish a union. The factory side, meanwhile, hired anti-union consultants at great expense to defend inch by inch. The union here ultimately failed to establish. The factory successfully dismantled the union offensive thanks to sound consulting.
Thus, when the film wrapped at the end of 2017, the theme of "Rust Belt Redemption" had been completely overturned. Cultural conflicts on the shop floor brought profound torment, whether to Chinese managers or workshop workers. Yet this surprising conflict theme did not come from the US-China trade war. When the documentary finished shooting in December 2017, the overwhelming trade tariffs of 2018 had not yet started.
Entering 2018, US-China relations deteriorated sharply, and public hostility rose. The warmth of "manufacturing revival" turned into cold labor-management relations. "American Factory" stimulated imagination about the sensitive intersection of "Chinese capital entering the US Rust Belt." At this moment, "American Factory," carrying sparks of shop floor friction, became empirical evidence of people's anxiety.
In 2020, this film unexpectedly won the Oscar for Best Documentary. The filter of US-China rivalry further amplified and widely spread anxiety. This also unexpectedly brought huge visibility to Fuyao Glass, making it the most representative model of Chinese enterprises' factories in the US.
Subsequently, many Chinese factories began journeys of mass migration, and quite a few brave enterprises went to build factories in the US. The US began viewing investments from China with vigilance, and various state governments introduced increasingly strict restriction clauses. Texas, which has always welcomed Chinese investment, enacted SB147, restricting long-term leasing of factory buildings by Chinese entities. For Chinese enterprises, the investment environment in the US seemed to be declining day by day.
But for enterprises that have already landed factories in the US, sharp geopolitical issues basically lose their edge. The real difficulties faced by enterprises remain daily battles with workers and refined management. Employee friction at Fuyao Factory has not been thoroughly resolved, but it is no longer terrifying. The turnover rate at Fuyao Glass's Ohio factory remains high. An auto parts factory across the street is the same. But these do not affect the normal operation of Chinese-funded enterprises.
Now, the high-end glass industry of this factory possesses the world's most advanced automated production lines. From unpacking raw glass sheets to warehousing finished glass, the entire process is automated, operated entirely by robotic arms. Side window forming machines can produce a piece of glass every 3 seconds. Human positions are further replaced. In fact, Fuyao Group has a dedicated mechanical manufacturing division internally, specializing in non-standard equipment, achieving a self-developed equipment ratio of 94%.
In building factories in the US, any link theoretically capable of automation is pushed to full automation. The theme revealed by "American Factory"—that "globalization and automation make it difficult to return to past employment prosperity"—is increasingly becoming a penetrating fable.
Difficult Deep Management
A huge reef of US manufacturing lies in invisible hidden costs. Every factory has invisible waste; most are "folded factories," where many costs are folded and hidden. Only by drilling down to the second and third levels of cost flows can one truly know what dark things devour the enterprise's profits. Enterprise headquarters often lack means of on-site management.
The most direct "folding" occurs in workshop management. Managing workers in the US follows the rule of "reward with addition, strictly prohibit punishment with subtraction." Even if a worker's mistake causes serious product defects, wages absolutely cannot be deducted directly, as this touches the red line of US labor law. HR here, although paid by the boss, prioritizes preventing costly labor lawsuits, thus often acting as if defending employee rights. Under this mechanism, Chinese bosses find it hard to grasp the true status of the workshop through face-to-face pressure, and errors occurring on the front line are tightly covered up.
Domestically, various digital systems are deeply ingrained, accelerating the process of on-site transparency. No matter how diversified the business or how many subsidiaries, leveraging increasingly perfect IT information system experience allows deep opening of subsidiary operational details, with nothing to hide. A leading domestic mechanical manufacturing enterprise has mature mobile APP systems recording the entire process of sales lead advancement and service fulfillment. Promoting these IT systems overseas, whether in India or Southeast Asia, is easily achieved. Only in the US is this system difficult to implement.
The US branch's sales system uses Salesforce, completely different from the CRM system developed by China itself. The dealer system developed independently in the US is also vastly different from methods used in China. Even if the US subsidiary adopts the same SAP as headquarters, the two are often incompatible. Or, data sharing is hindered by privacy regulations.
US management can easily cut real-time connections with headquarters' information systems citing reasons like data compliance. US factories form visible spatial information islands. Information obtained by enterprise headquarters always has a long time lag, preventing timely reactions. The independent decision-making power of the US CEO also causes many Chinese employees, even if on-site, to become disconnected from domestic divisions.
When executives from this leading domestic mechanical manufacturing enterprise's headquarters visited the US factory for research, they could not understand why the warehouse was piled full of raw materials. These were never clearly reflected in reports. What looks like obvious stagnant costs domestically often leaves US managers indifferent.
This means Chinese enterprises can only achieve control without being on-site through transparent data. Chinese enterprises have to send domestic managers to serve as CEOs overseas to compensate for such defects.
Without digitalized factories, management is a major disaster. Immature companies lacking the ability to penetrate hidden directories will abandon armor and drop weapons in the US. Reclaiming the lost ground of information control is an important strategy for strengthening overall management. A good IT system, one that can connect with headquarters, is vital. Whether IT systems can be implemented in US factories will be a severe test for Chinese enterprises.
Note: A Rite of Passage for Internationalization
The manufacturing reshoring advocated by the US government is actually unlikely to happen easily. But for business operations, enterprises can certainly find their niche markets in the US and still survive.
As long as the calculations are clear and it is recognized that the US market must eventually be entered, going early is definitely better than going late. On one hand, from the perspective of US-China environments and policies, tightening is a trend for both sides. From the perspective of micro-level combat, in many fields, once a Chinese enterprise arrives first, the possibility of peers following becomes very small. When one enterprise survives, it is generally difficult for peers to enter.
In China, industries typically exhibit the "crab peer" phenomenon: when an industry makes money, cross-industry capital squeezes in. If fiberglass from China Jushi and Taishan Fiberglass makes money, then Dongfang Hope doing electrolytic aluminum, or Tianhao doing coal in Inner Mongolia, will kill into this industry. But in the US, extremely high factory construction thresholds, complex labor relations, and expensive compliance costs naturally block this phenomenon of capital "running rampant." This harsh heavy-asset barrier precisely becomes the best moat for Chinese enterprises that went to the US to build factories early.
Building factories in the US is often the hardest for Chinese enterprises. But only by doing so can the challenges of long-term corporate profitability and income structure perhaps be truly solved. Chinese enterprises building factories in the US is the highest rite of passage for completing internationalization.
About the Author
Lin Xueping: General Manager of Beijing Lianxun Power Consulting Co., Ltd.; Visiting Researcher at the Institute for Quality Development, Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Author of "Great Going Global," "Supply Chain Offense and Defense," and "Value Discovery."
Special thanks to Mr. Lin Xinwei of Lingmei Company, who assisted Chinese enterprises in landing factories in the US, for walking together with me through those cities, suburbs, and workshops.